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INTRODUCTION
Listen for a while to crime victims and you will hear both frustration and resignation about plea bargaining, but you will hear no true
believers. Some crime victims sound relieved that the plea bargain
spares them from the prolonged ordeal of a trial: as one woman put
1
it, “I just want it over with.” Others take comfort in the idea that a
guilty plea holds the defendant responsible: “It’s what we were looking for the last three years . . . . He admitted that he was involved and
2
played a part.” Some note that the plea eliminates any risk of acquittal at trial: “I know there are people out there who do far worse and
3
get off for their crimes.”
Alongside these lukewarm endorsements, there are plenty of
comments on the negative side of the ledger. Victims frequently say
the punishment that the defendant received after a plea bargain was
4
not what they expected, complaining about “a slap on the wrist.”
1

Gwen Filosa, Woman Changes Guilty Plea in Killing, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 4, 2004, at B-1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a murder victim’s mother after the alleged killer changed her guilty plea); see also Carol Demare,
Victim at Peace with Boxley Plea Deal, TIMES UNION (Albany), Dec. 24, 2003, at B1 (quoting the sexual assault victim of a politically powerful defendant as saying, “[a]ctually, I
was relieved that a plea bargain could be reached,” and noting that she was “extremely
nervous” about testifying).
2
Thomasi McDonald, Parents Accept Wreck Penalty, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh),
July 2, 2004, at B1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a manslaughter victim’s father, who was responding to the killer’s acceptance of a plea bargain); see also
Demare, supra note 1, at B1 (quoting the victim as saying, “I felt most importantly that
Boxley be held accountable for what he did and [the plea] took care of that”).
3
Sarah Coppola, Sentence Has Some Victims Unhappy, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July
1, 2004, at B1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a victim, familiar with the
plea bargaining system through her employment with Child Protective Services, who
was responding to the plea bargain accepted by a man guilty of improper photography).
4
See, e.g., Alan Gomez, Delray Pastor To Serve No Time for Molestation, PALM BEACH
POST, June 25, 2004, at 1C (discussing the case of a pastor who received five years probation as punishment for sexually molesting a nine-year-old girl); see also, e.g., John
Caher, Ex-Assembly Counsel Boxley Sentenced to a Misdemeanor, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 2004, at 1
(quoting a sexual assault victim after her assaulter was sentenced only on a misdemeanor sex count); Coppola, supra note 3, at B1 (discussing the plea bargain of two
years imprisonment accepted by a defendant who secretly videotaped 500 women in
the dressing room of a gym); McDonald, supra note 2, at B1 (quoting a manslaughter
victim’s father who said, in response to a plea bargain of thirty-six months probation
and a suspended license, “[B]asically there were no dire consequences”). For survey
evidence about popular disapproval of plea bargaining, see Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 103 (1989) (concluding that “[m]ost Canadians disapprove of the process of plea bargaining”); Patricia
A. Payne, Plea Bargaining: A Necessary Evil?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE
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Some question the judgment of prosecutors who are overly driven by a
fear of losing or the emotional costs of a trial: “[The prosecutor] told
me that if they went to trial and he gets acquitted, she couldn’t live
5
with that . . . . It’s not for her to live with. It’s for me.” For others,
the problem with a plea bargain is that it blocks the public from learning the full story of the defendant’s crime: “it prevents all the facts
6
from coming out.” Worst of all, plea bargaining can pressure some
7
defendants to accept convictions for crimes they did not commit.
It is little wonder that crime victims demonstrate such contradictory, even confused, reactions to plea bargains. Those of us who study
or work in criminal justice full-time are likewise conflicted and confused about the practice, and as a result we have not yet created adequate ways to change plea negotiations for the better.
Our current discussions of plea bargains offer little hope of improving matters because they take place either at too high or too low a
level of abstraction. Sometimes we evaluate plea bargains at the case
level. The trial judge asks whether a particular defendant entered a
8
“knowing and voluntary” guilty plea, founded on some “factual basis.”

232, 232 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1994) (describing common public concerns regarding
plea bargaining); Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in 16
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 149 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992) (discussing studies that have shown that a majority of Americans and Canadians disapprove of plea bargaining).
5
See Gwen Filosa, Family of Dead Teen is Against Plea Deal, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Apr. 6, 2004, at B-1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the mother
of a homicide victim); see also Coppola, supra note 3, at B1 (noting the prosecutor’s
hesitation to try an alleged improper photographer in nine separate cases, in part because of the emotional drain on victims); Gomez, supra note 4, at 1C (quoting a victim
who said that in offering a plea bargain, prosecutors were too preoccupied with the
emotional toll a trial would put on her); Fred Lebrun, Courtroom Shift Spurs New Debate,
TIMES UNION (Albany), Feb. 24, 2004, at B1 (quoting the victim as saying, “I was eager
to avoid a trial the district attorney’s office said we could not win”).
6
See Rex Bowman, Former Law-School Student Gets Life for Three Slayings, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2004, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the
attorney for students wounded by a shooter); see also Rose Dunn, Letter to the Editor,
Plea Bargain Wasn’t Punishment Enough, HOME NEWS TRIB. (East Brunswick, N.J.), Dec.
25, 2003, at A15 (responding to the plea bargain in an aggravated manslaughter case
by asking, “Why was this case decided by two people instead of a jury?”).
7
See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1342 (1997) (“[A] rational [but innocent] defendant who is likely to be convicted may choose the lesser sentence resulting
from a plea bargain rather than risk erroneous conviction.”).
8
For various formulations of the standards for factual basis, voluntariness, and
knowledge, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (“Before accepting a plea of guilty . . . , the
court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the
plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).”); FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a
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Any plea meeting this standard will be legally sound and will meet the
approval of most judges and attorneys. Yet this standard that courts
use to evaluate guilty pleas at the individual case level is anemic, since
the facts supporting guilty pleas can be remarkably thin, and many
“knowing” and “voluntary” guilty pleas are nevertheless coercive and
unjust.
At other times, we evaluate plea bargaining at a very high level of
abstraction, treating this disposition of criminal cases as a social institution that deserves our embrace, or our acquiescence, or our condemnation as a whole. Perhaps we should think of plea bargaining as
9
a method of making criminal adjudication more efficient; perhaps
instead we should consider it a squalid and unnecessary procedural
10
shortcut. In any case, the point of thinking at this highest level of
abstraction is to evaluate the impact of all plea bargains on criminal
justice and on the social order.
This vantage point, considering plea bargaining as a social institution, delivers genuine insights about the practice, yet it is also enervating. Because no one will abolish plea bargains entirely from the
11
American criminal courtroom, what we need is a regulatory strategy
rather than further insights on the question of abolition. The caseand society-wide levels of analysis have not shown us where to regulate
or how to sort the good plea bargains from the bad ones.
A mid-level theory would fit better with the current reality of plea
bargaining in the United States and would best mark the road to reform. This sort of theory would allow us to analyze guilty pleas at the
system level for each jurisdiction, recognizing that in some places plea
bargain practices are relatively benign, while in others there is something amiss in bargain justice.

guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”), and
compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a) (2004) (“[T]he court may
accept [a charge bargain] if . . . the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and . . . accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.”).
9
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
289, 289 (1983) (arguing that plea bargaining is an element “of a well-functioning
market system”).
10
See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1037, 1107 (1984) (arguing that plea bargaining is not inevitable and that it should not
be preferred to a bench trial).
11
See generally George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000)
(examining the development of plea bargaining into a dominant force in American
criminal procedure).
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This Article develops a “trial distortion” theory as one possible
mid-level evaluation of plea negotiation practices in particular systems. According to this theory, criminal courts in a jurisdiction produce too many dysfunctional guilty pleas when those guilty pleas distort the pattern of outcomes that would have resulted from trials. A
healthy system would aspire to replicate through its guilty pleas the
same pattern of outcomes that trials would have produced. Trial distortion theory calls attention to case outcomes rather than negotiations in progress, and to patterns across cases rather than practices in
a single case.
Acquittals and dismissals play a starring role in the trial distortion
story. These are cases that might have resulted in a defendant’s freedom, and when a system starts to produce fewer acquittals and fewer
dismissals, it triggers a warning light about the truth-finding function
of the criminal justice system.
In some systems, further inquiry might show that a drop in the acquittal rate amounted to a false alarm, revealing no real basis for concern. According to a reassuring line of reasoning that I will call the
“accuracy hypothesis,” fewer acquittals might simply reveal a system
that produces increasingly accurate outcomes. The accuracy might be
achieved through a higher quality of cases entering the system, an improvement made possible when prosecutors make more time to
screen more carefully the cases referred to them. Perhaps law enforcement agents get better at collecting the evidence needed to win a
case. Similarly, downward trends in the acquittal rates might merely
reflect better trial preparation and performance by prosecutors, or
better negotiating skills among all the attorneys.
In some other systems, however, a drop in the acquittal rate could
point to very real problems with the quality of criminal justice. Lower
acquittal rates might show that prosecutors sell difficult cases too
cheaply and only take easy cases to trial. On the other hand, lower
acquittal rates might indicate that defendants sell too cheaply, either
because timid or underfunded defense attorneys cannot or will not
challenge the prosecutor’s weakest cases, or (the most chilling possibility) because the judge and the prosecutor threaten the defendant
12
with too great a penalty for going to trial.
12

In addition, a long-term drop in the rate of acquittals might become worrisome
when acquittals no longer serve their market discipline function during plea negotiations. Acquittals at trials might become so rare that they cannot check abuses during
bargaining. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463, 2470-76 (2004) (discussing the problematic incentives of prosecutors in
plea negotiations that do not reflect expected trial outcomes); Gerard E. Lynch, Our
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It is only possible to choose between these theoretical possibilities—the trial distortion theory and the accuracy hypothesis—by observing particular criminal justice systems at work; accordingly, this
Article interprets the patterns of guilty pleas and acquittals in the fed13
eral criminal justice system.
Acquittals are steadily disappearing
from the federal system. Indeed, acquittals are disappearing more
quickly than any other outcome, including trial convictions and dismissals, as guilty pleas expand to displace all other outcomes in federal court. The drop in acquittals over the last thirty years flags some
serious doubts about the quality of justice in the federal system to14
day.
A close look at the system tells us that increasing accuracy probably does not explain this trend; unfortunately, the pattern has unfolded because federal prosecutors have accumulated so much power
under the sentencing laws that they can punish defendants too severely for going to trial. Federal law must respond to the current distorting form of plea negotiations by restoring counterbalances to
prosecutorial bargaining power and by limiting the techniques available to reward defendants for waiving their trials.
Part I of this Article reviews the underappreciated history of guilty
plea rates in the federal criminal justice system. Surprisingly, federal
guilty plea rates stayed flat during some periods and even declined
significantly during the 1950s and 1960s. After a relentless climb from
the early 1970s to the present, however, the most recent numbers
show the highest rates of guilty pleas in the history of federal criminal
justice. Part II documents how acquittal rates moved down whenever
guilty plea rates went up. In fact, since 1971 acquittal rates have
dropped faster than other outcomes, such as dismissals or trial convictions.

Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2146 (1998)
(“[F]ully-adjudicated cases may be too rare to serve as a meaningful check on the executive authorities.”).
13
To evaluate these patterns, I have compiled the relevant data in a web-based Statistical Appendix for this Article, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=809124 [hereinafter Statistical Appendix]. Unless otherwise noted, the Statistical Appendix is the
source for the data in this Article’s tables and figures.
14
In 1975, Michael Finkelstein pursued this insight about the importance of acquittals and dismissals in the evaluation of guilty pleas in a path-breaking statistical
analysis of federal criminal justice. Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty
Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1975). For a discussion of the
intellectual debt I owe Finkelstein, and the limitations of his approach, see infra note
74.
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What explains the disappearance of acquittals in recent decades?
In Part III we look for answers based in the history of federal criminal
justice. Shifts in the types of crimes charged explain some of the patterns. The strengthened presence of defense counsel accounts for the
declining guilty plea rate in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the most
important cause of rising guilty pleas and falling acquittals in recent
decades has been a dramatic increase in prosecutorial resources.
Surprisingly, federal prosecutors today handle far fewer cases per attorney than they did in the middle of the twentieth century.
Part IV pursues a deeper inquiry into federal plea practices, concentrating on more recent years. Building on the premise that each
of the ninety-four federal judicial districts employs its own plea practices with distinctive side effects, I analyze district-level statistics from
1994 to the present to determine which environmental factors most
strongly affect both guilty pleas and acquittals.
This study points toward a symbiosis between plea practices and
sentencing law. The federal system over the last three decades has
featured increasingly severe sentences, and the adoption of federal
sentencing guidelines in the late 1980s enhanced the power of prosecutors and judges to reward cooperation from defendants. In those
districts where prosecutors took full advantage of the tools available to
them under the sentencing laws, it became more expensive than ever
for a federal defendant to insist on a trial; fewer paid the price each
year.
Two of the most important tools used to increase the plea discount were “substantial assistance” departures that rewarded defendants with lighter sentences for cooperating with the government to
15
develop cases against other defendants, and “acceptance of responsibility” adjustments to lighten the sentences of defendants who pled
guilty early and gave the government full information about their
16
crimes. The real power of these tools becomes clear when we notice
that districts making heavy use of these techniques produced both
higher guilty plea rates and lower acquittal rates. In those districts,

15

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) (“Upon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court
may depart from the guidelines.”).
16
See id. § 3E1.1 (mandating the reduction of a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the
defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,” and under some circumstances, if “the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation
or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to
enter a plea of guilty”).
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the trial penalty—that is, the differential between the sentence after
plea and sentence after trial—convinced more defendants to abandon
worthwhile defenses. In short, the combination of charging and sentencing options gave federal prosecutors the power to distort trial
outcomes.
Having identified some features of the federal legal landscape that
contribute to the most distorting plea negotiation practices, can we
put these discoveries to work? Is reform possible? These questions
achieved new urgency in early 2005, when the Supreme Court threw
federal sentencing out of kilter with its decision in United States v.
17
Booker. It was immediately clear that federal sentencing would never
be the same after this case. Congress began considering ways to repair
the broken system, and key legislators pronounced this to be a mo18
ment for serious rethinking of the federal sentencing system.
In this rare time of reflection and redesign, the effects of sentencing rules on plea negotiation practices should remain at the center of
our attention. When we judge plea negotiations by the patterns of
outcomes they produce, they reveal the importance of two avenues for
reform. First, sentencing rules need to check the monopoly power of
prosecutors over key sentencing discounts. The judge needs credible
authority to override prosecutorial decisions that punish defendants
too severely when they insist on a trial. Second, sentencing reforms
must keep within tolerable bounds the penalty that a defendant must
pay for going to trial, whether the prosecutor or the judge is the
source of that penalty. Sentencing reforms moving in these directions
will both restore a balance of powers in federal criminal justice and
improve the accuracy of the system. Federal sentencing should become more a servant of truth and less a slave to efficient case disposition.

17

125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (holding that any facts that increase the maximum
available sentencing range must be found by the jury rather than the sentencing
judge); see also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004) (holding similarly
to Booker, but with respect to state sentencing guidelines).
18
See Posting of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, Panel 1 Sentencing Hearing Highlights, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_
policy/2004/07/panel_1_senate_.html ( July 13, 2004, 11:53 AM) (describing the
statements of senators in the hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee on “Blakely v.
Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines”). See generally Posting of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, The House Hearing and Data
Versus Anecdote in Sentencing Policy-Making, http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/02/data_versus_ane.html (Feb. 10, 2005, 12:58 PM)
(describing the hearing of the House Judiciary Committee on “The Implications of the
Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines”).
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I. GUILTY PLEAS THAT RESOLVE CASES BUT NOT QUESTIONS
High-quality criminal justice and guilty pleas can coexist under
the right conditions. Nevertheless, for over a century, lawyers and
judges in the United States have treated “high” levels of guilty pleas as
a cause for concern.
The worries became more acute during times of change, when
guilty pleas threatened to make the criminal trial disappear. For instance, in the 1920s, attorneys and academics studied criminal justice
systems in many states and reported with alarm that criminal jury trials
19
were vanishing.
In many cities, the percentage of convictions obtained from guilty pleas exceeded 70%—low figures by today’s stan20
dards, but jarring to attorneys at the time. Concern about the loss of
21
criminal trials picked up again in the late 1960s and 1970s.
Although higher guilty plea percentages captured the headlines,
times of growth were not constants. For example, we know that guilty
pleas fell dramatically during several decades during the nineteenth
22
century in Massachusetts.
We know a lot about what sends guilty
19

See, e.g., Alfred Bettman, Prosecution, in CLEVELAND FOUND., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND 83, 95 tbl.3, 149, 181, 208 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922)
(discussing the reasons, which included the prevalence of guilty pleas, for fewer trials);
HUGH N. FULLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN VIRGINIA 79 tbl.39 (1931) (showing an increase
in urban-jurisdiction guilty plea rates, out of those for whom guilt was established,
from 50% in 1917 to 75% in 1927); C.E. Gehlke, Recorded Felonies: An Analysis and General Survey, in ILL. ASS’N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY 25, 42-46,
72-86 (John H. Wigmore ed., 1929) (providing reasons for “trial court eliminations”
and discussing the impact of plea bargaining thereon); see also Albert W. Alschuler,
Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26-32 (1979) (discussing the criminal justice surveys of the 1920s).
20
See Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 105 (1928) (showing that, of twenty-four jurisdictions surveyed, only three showed that less than 70% of
convictions were obtained through guilty pleas and five showed that at least 90% were
so obtained).
21
See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 19-20 (1966)
(assessing the reasons for guilty pleas); DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (Frank J. Remington ed.,
1966) (“Roughly 90 per cent of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty . . . .”);
DALLIN H. OAKS & WARREN LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT:
A STUDY OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY 59, 66 (1968) (providing tables illustrating
guilty plea percentages in Chicago). See generally Alschuler, supra note 19 (reviewing
studies of guilty plea rates).
22
Our most complete information about nineteenth-century plea rates (and about
early guilty plea practices more generally) comes from George Fisher’s engaging history of the middle-tier criminal courts in Massachusetts. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003). Fisher also
offers some useful breakdowns among different types of crimes, with distinctive movement in the rates for liquor sales crimes, murders, and other offenses. See, e.g., id. at 35
tbl.1.2
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plea rates up, but we could also profit from asking what sends them
sideways or down. Just as we can draw lessons from particular places
23
that operate with unusually low levels of negotiated guilty pleas, we
can also learn much from concentrating on time periods when guilty
plea rates decline. Special attention to periods of declining rates
might better explain the causes of, and predict the future of, guilty
plea rates. The federal system has seen both—times of boom and
bust—in guilty pleas.
If periods of increasing guilty pleas provoke questions about the
quality of criminal justice, what answers have we found so far? What
qualifies as a rate that is “too high”? The last section of this Part surveys the misleading answers we give from analysis at the individual
case level, and the truthful but paralyzing answers we give at the societal level.
A. Federal Guilty Plea Growth Spurts
The federal courts handled federal crimes from the nation’s earliest years, but the number of criminal cases moving through the system
each year remained quite small for several decades. Nationwide statistics about federal criminal enforcement first became available in a
convenient form in 1871, after Congress required an annual report
24
from the Attorney General. These reports collected figures for convictions, acquittals, dismissals, and jury trials, but in a telling omission,
There were also some remarkable stretches of stability for the rates in Connecticut. Milton Heumann’s study of the superior courts in Connecticut was one of the few
efforts to track plea rates over many decades in the twentieth century. Milton Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (1975). The
study confirmed stable trial rates from 1880 to 1954. See id. at 520. Heumann constructed this study as part of an effort to show that caseload does not drive guilty plea
practices; he compared guilty plea rates in high-volume courts to those in low-volume
courts, and compared guilty plea rates before and after a large decrease in court
caseload (although he did not account for increased system resources to handle the
additional cases). See id. at 518-524.
23
See generally Teresa White Carns & John Kruse, A Re-evaluation of Alaska’s Plea
Bargaining Ban, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 27 (1991) (examining the continuing feasibility of
Alaska’s ban on plea bargaining); Colin Loftin et al., Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms
Violence: Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 287 (1983) (analyzing Detroit’s prosecutorial ban on plea bargaining in firearms cases); Schulhofer,
supra note 10 (studying the exceptionally low guilty plea rates in Philadelphia); Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002)
(studying the effects of limits on charge bargains and sentence bargains in New Orleans from the 1970s through the 1990s).
24
See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 12, 16 Stat. 162, 164 (requiring the Attorney
General to make an annual report including statistics on federal and state crimes),
amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 238, § 1, 17 Stat. 578, 578.
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they did not include information about guilty pleas until the 1908 re25
port.
The reports depicted a growing system, although the expansion
26
was uneven, as Table 1 shows. The earliest annual reports, from the
decade of the 1870s, reported an average of 6,984 cases terminated in
the federal criminal docket each year. During the 1920s and early
1930s, spurred by liquor prosecutions under the National Prohibition
27
Act, the number of cases shot up from 26,476 in 1920 to 95,820 in
28
1932, before dropping back to 38,667 in 1934, the year after the con29
stitutional basis for the Act was repealed.
Table 1: Average Annual Number of Defendants or Cases,
30
Terminated in Federal Courts by Decades, 1871-2002
1871-1879
1880-1889
1890-1899
1900-1909
1910-1919
1920-1929
1930-1939

25

6,984
9,181
14,026
8,713
14,334
58,326
64,489

1940-1949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2002

41,178
37,366
32,782
46,619
46,202
61,364
76,519

See Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 301 (“Federal data for [guilty plea rates] are
available in the Annual Reports of the Attorney General back to 1908.” (footnote omitted)). By 1940, the job of collecting and reporting the annual statistics on terminated
criminal cases in the federal courts fell to the newly formed Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (AOUSC). See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, sec. 1, § 304, 53
Stat. 1223, 1223-24 (establishing the AOUSC and giving that office the duty to collect
statistical data of the business transacted by the courts).
26
See also Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 494, 496-508 (1934) (analyzing criminal prosecutions from 1922 until 1933). For more complete annual statistics, see the Statistical Appendix, supra note
13. Earlier compilations of federal criminal case disposition statistics appear in Finkelstein, supra note 14, apps. I, II, & III, and ALI, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, pt. I, at 56-58 (1934).
27
Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1933) (restricting the use and
manufacture of alcoholic beverages).
28
See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1 (showing the number of convictions, acquittals, and dismissals for each year).
29
See United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222-26 (1934) (holding that the
National Prohibition Act was inoperative following the ratification of the Twenty-First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and that any prosecutions or appeals pending
under that Act were to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
30
The figures from 1906, 1909, 1935, and 1942-1944 are not included in these averages because the source data is either incorrect, unavailable, or in a different format.
See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at 4.
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31

The number of defendants dropped modestly in the late 1940s
32
and 1950s, partly a result of a decline in immigration cases.
The
number surged between 1970 and 1977 and then fell back temporarily
from 1977 to 1980. Finally, the system grew in almost every year from
33
1980 to the present.
Not surprisingly, the number of guilty pleas entered in federal
court grew along with the system, but the overall proportion of guilty
pleas also ballooned over the last twenty-five years. Using a baseline of
34
all adjudicated cases, guilty pleas trended downward from the 1950s
through the 1970s before starting a sustained climb in 1980. The ver35
tical line on Figure 1 marks the two distinct periods. By 2002, defendants pleading guilty represented the largest share of adjudicated
36
cases in the history of federal criminal justice, at 95.2%.

31

Starting in 1936, the federal statistics calculate the number of defendants rather
than the number of cases. See ALI, supra note 26, at 27 (arguing that the difference
between the two units of analysis is not very large in the federal system).
32
Cf. Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at 13-14.
33
See id. at app. 1. Some of this growth is to be expected in a nation with a growing population. In 1950, the federal courts terminated one criminal case for every
3,580 people in the country; in 2000, the federal courts terminated one criminal case
for every 4,760 people.
34
For a discussion of the merits of adjudicated cases (guilty and nolo pleas, trial
convictions, acquittals, and mistrials) as a base, and an alternative base of terminated
cases (adjudicated cases plus dismissals), see the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at
4-5.
35
The story from earlier years is interesting in its own right, but less pertinent for
our immediate purposes. The first prominent event in the story of guilty plea rates is
the remarkable growth between 1910 (with a starting point of 67.1%) and 1933 (when
the rate reached 91.1%). A second phase, from 1935 to 1951, saw a brief drop to
80.4% in 1941, and then a decade of increases, topping out at 90.3% in 1951. See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1.
36
That same year guilty pleas accounted for 96.2% of the federal convictions. See
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1 (showing 68,188 guilty pleas and 70,882
convictions in 2002). Reports from the Bureau of Justice Statistics have noted the increased guilty plea rate in recent decades. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197104, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2001: WITH
TRENDS 1982-2001, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
fccp01.pdf (“Almost all (95%) of those convicted in [2001 federal criminal cases]
pleaded guilty or no contest.”).
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Figure 1: Federal Guilty and Nolo Pleas in
Adjudicated Cases, 1945-2002 (Percent)
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These levels of change in the last quarter of the century carry serious consequences. If plea rates were to fall back to 1980 levels and
the total number of defendants remained the same, the number of
federal trials (and all the resources needed to support them) would
37
increase nearly ten-fold.
The possible explanations for these high and low tides of guilty
pleas must wait for Part III. Before seeking out the causes of the
changes, we must become acquainted with two ways to evaluate the
growth of guilty pleas.
B. Plea Bargain Theories, Looking High and Low
In an adversarial system of litigation, can true justice happen in
38
the absence of trials? There was a time in the United States when
judges in criminal cases answered this question with a clear-cut “no.”
37

See Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970)
(noting that a small reduction in guilty pleas could have a large impact on the court
system).
38
Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that
settlement poses serious problems for justice and should not be accepted as an alternative to trial); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 733 (2004) (suggesting that normative evaluation of the
disappearance of civil trials depends on whether such trials are replaced by private settlements or public, non-trial adjudication).
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Some judicial opinions from the nineteenth century refused to countenance negotiated guilty pleas, and some even had qualms about
guilty pleas entered without apparent negotiations between the prose39
cution and defense.
And yet the answer to this question today, for those who work
daily in courtrooms across the United States, is a troubled “yes.”
Criminal justice experts—prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys—assure us that plea bargains are necessary and create important
40
public benefits, so the practice remains unpopular but stable. The
guilty plea rates are sky-high everywhere and have stayed high for decades, yet the sky never falls.
Scholars have created theoretical accounts of guilty pleas on two
different levels in response to this reality. Some guilty plea theories
evaluate plea negotiations on the micro-level, asking about the intentions of the parties in each case. Other theories pursue a macro-level
approach, tracing the broad social effects of discounted sentences.
This section will explain why neither level of analysis can help us diagnose problems with and improve plea practices.
1. Micro-Level Intentions
One of the important differences among guilty plea theories is the
type of information they use for evaluation. Some accounts of guilty
pleas look to the intentions of individual actors in each case. These
tests fail, however, because they turn on information that is not routinely available.
The standard legal test for the validity of guilty pleas rests on a micro-level inquiry, asking whether the defendant in a particular case
41
“knowingly and voluntarily” waived the right to trial.
Courts and

39

See Edwards v. People, 39 Mich. 760, 763 (1878) (requiring the trial judge to
examine the defendant, out of the presence of the prosecutor, about his reasons for
pleading guilty, to prevent abuses of prosecutorial power); Commonwealth v. Battis, 1
Mass. 95, 95-96 (1804) (demanding extreme caution in the acceptance of guilty pleas
entered in capital cases).
40
See Barnett E. Hoffman, Letter to the Editor, Courts Would Stall Without Plea Bargains, HOME NEWS TRIB. (East Brunswick, N.J.), Jan. 9, 2004, at A10 (arguing that,
given the extremely high ratio of indictments to judges, plea bargaining is a practical
necessity).
41
See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution
insists . . . that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is ‘voluntary’ and that the defendant must make related waivers ‘knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” (brackets in original) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970))). See generally MARC L.
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECU-
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procedural rules set up easily achieved requirements for demonstrating knowledge: the defendant must know some specifics about the
charges filed, the most important procedural rights available at trial,
42
and at least some of the consequences of a conviction. The defendant in a serious case must also have competent legal counsel to ex43
plain this information before pleading guilty. But when it comes to
the defendant’s “voluntariness”—the second half of the formula—
courts have walked away. The proper knowledge, together with a pro
forma statement from the defendant that her guilty plea was not coerced, normally suffices.
Consider some of the coercive environments that are said to produce “voluntary” guilty pleas according to this standard. The size of
the differential between the post-trial sentence and the post-plea sentence can become enormous. When a defendant faces a possible life
sentence after conviction at trial and the prosecutor offers to reduce
charges, making possible a sentence of only a few years, the resulting
guilty plea is considered voluntary so long as the defendant says the
44
magic words at the guilty plea hearing. The strength of the defendant’s available defense does not figure at all. The government’s evidence gets only the most perfunctory testing when the prosecutor

MATERIALS 1037-58 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing knowledge, voluntariness, and an
adequate factual basis to support the charges as the “three essential ingredients for a
valid plea of guilty”).
42
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (directing courts, before accepting a guilty plea, to
ensure that the defendant understands the rights she waives, that the plea was entered
into voluntarily, and that there is a factual basis for the plea); Henderson v. Morgan,
426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (holding that a guilty plea is not voluntary unless the defendant receives “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (requiring that a defendant entering a guilty plea understand that she waives her right
against compulsory self-incrimination, her right to trial by jury, and her right to confront her accusers); State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238-39 (N.J. 2003) (concluding
that, before accepting a defendant’s plea, a court must ensure that the defendant understands the possibility of indefinite future civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act that may result from the plea). But cf. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629-33 (allowing the entry of a guilty plea despite the plea agreement’s limitations on prosecutorial
disclosure of “material impeachment evidence”).
43
See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957) (holding that a defendant in a
murder case had a constitutional right to counsel before entering a guilty plea).
44
For an account of an exceptional case in which the trial judge did not accept a
plea of guilty despite the proper catechism responses from the defendant, see Associated Press, Judge Nixes Guilty Plea in AOL Spam Case, Dec. 21, 2004, http://i.abcnews.
com/Business/wireStory?id=350717 (reporting that Judge Alvin Hellerstein refused to
accept a guilty plea from AOL software engineer Jason Smathers because the judge was
not convinced that Smathers had committed a crime under the new federal “canspam” legislation).
TIVE
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orally summarizes, in a few moments at the guilty plea hearing, the
45
“factual basis” of the government’s case.
A defendant can enter a “voluntary” plea even while maintaining
her innocence; such Alford pleas are said to express the defendant’s
voluntary acknowledgement that the government’s evidence is too
46
strong. Even if the judge who will preside at trial and pronounce the
sentence urges the defendant to accept a plea offer rather than going
to trial, in many jurisdictions such a guilty plea is considered volun47
tary.
This legal doctrine grows out of a contractual view of plea bargaining. In their purest form, contractual theories evaluate plea negotiations on the same grounds used to evaluate private contract negotiations. For each case, individual negotiators are presumed to act in
their own best interests. The presumption is strong, and perhaps irrebuttable: only the parties know their own interests and any systemwide effort to second-guess the outcomes negotiated by willing buyers
48
and sellers would be folly.
These theories treat the potential results at trial as an imperfect
measure of what really happened at the scene of the crime; the negotiating parties themselves will have more complete information on this
score, without interference from rules of evidence and other artifacts
45

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring the court to find some factual basis for
the plea). The guilty plea can be declared knowing and voluntary even if the judge
accepts the guilty plea but does not accept the plea agreement that induced the defendant to plead guilty. See United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 671 (1997) (holding
that a defendant could not withdraw his plea after the district court had accepted the
plea but deferred the decision on whether to accept the plea agreement); Julian A.
Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 863-68 (2004) (examining the rules allowing for the
acceptance of a guilty plea without acceptance of the plea agreement).
46
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (holding that a guilty
plea could be entered despite the defendant’s belief in his innocence when the State
demonstrated a strong factual basis for the plea).
47
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-211 (2005) (allowing the court to advise the defendant regarding whether it will accept a proposed guilty plea and to afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw that plea); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(a) (2005)
(allowing the trial judge to participate in plea discussions); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 402(d)
(permitting the trial judge to opine when parties propose a plea deal); State v. Warner,
762 So. 2d 507, 514 (Fla. 2000) (finding that a court may comment on a plea deal proposed by the parties). Only explicit browbeating from the trial judge will lead to a
finding that a “knowing” plea was nevertheless “involuntary.” See, e.g., State v. Bouie,
817 So. 2d 48, 54-55 (La. 2002) (finding a plea to be involuntary when entered only
after repeated statements by the trial judge that acquittal was unlikely and that the sentence differential between a plea and a trial would be at least twenty years).
48
See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 308-322 (discussing the desirability of plea bargaining from a market perspective).
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49

of courtroom proof. Thus, the match between potential trial results
and actual negotiation results is not relevant to the quality of the
50
guilty plea.
Variations on the case-level contractual view of plea bargains—we
might label them “motive” theories—focus on the personal motives of
prosecutors. They attempt to identify recurring biases in the decisions
of prosecutors about whether to accept a proposed plea bargain.
Too often, however, motive theories produce contradictory accounts. One might theorize, based on an economic model of rational
behavior, that prosecutors try too few cases because they would rather
51
spend time golfing or pursuing some other leisure. Or one might
argue that prosecutors try too many cases because they want to develop
their trial skills and make themselves more attractive to private firms
52
offering large salaries. These theories are indeterminate because the

49

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969,
1970-71 (1992) (arguing that negotiations between sophisticated persons unencumbered by the rules of evidence produces more accurate results than trials produce).
50
Contractual theories also take more nuanced forms. Robert Scott and William
Stuntz concede the defendant’s voluntariness for most cases, but identify some exceptional settings where a fully informed (and innocent) defendant might enter an involuntary guilty plea. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1957-66 (1992) (examining the problem of incompetent defense
lawyering and situations where great disparity exists between a post-trial sentence and a
plea sentence). The Scott-Stuntz approach shares some features with trial distortion
theory. Like trial distortion theory, Scott and Stuntz measure the legitimacy of plea
bargains by their ability to produce accurate convictions. However, they promote rules
that make it easier for prosecutors to offer large discounts to defendants in weaker
cases and reject efforts to evaluate plea bargains based on the outcomes they produce.
51
Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 50-51 (1988) (noting that prosecutors are influenced by day-to-day
motivations that may rank higher than maximizing deterrence). Similarly, one might
theorize on the basis of sociological insights about “working groups” that prosecutors
try too few cases because they put too great a value on stable and non-adversarial relationships with judges and defense attorneys. See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT
JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 27-28, 3234 (1977) (describing how working-group dynamics strive to maintain cohesion and
reduce conflict within the courtroom); HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 234 (3d ed. 1993) (positing that close interactions within courtroom working
groups encourage plea bargain settlements).
52
See Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 288 (2000) (arguing that the decision to take cases to trial in the federal system is based partly on the desire of prosecutors to develop human capital in trials); Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Abstract,
The Sources of Agency: An Empirical Examination of United States Attorneys (1999), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=200508 (“[P]rosecutors may take cases to trial to
acquire human capital unless they are closely monitored.”).
As a matter of game theory, it is possible that prosecutors would go to trial more
often in their weakest cases, but a shift in a few working assumptions leads to the oppo-
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incentives at work on prosecutors and other actors in individual cases
point in different directions. The motive theories also concentrate on
a secondary level of social problems by promoting efficiency rather
than accuracy in criminal justice. The most compelling reason to try
more criminal cases is not to encourage an honest day’s work from
public servants. It is to promote the central reason behind the crimi53
nal trial: to sort the innocent from the guilty.
We need an alternative theory of guilty pleas, one that transcends
the hidden intentions and grudgingly spoken words of defendants
and the contradictory incentives at work on prosecutors in particular
cases. An external evaluation of guilty pleas is necessary because none
of the negotiating parties will reliably protect the public interest. The
prosecutor, as an agent of the public, will not necessarily follow the
wishes of the principal. Defense lawyers might also be viewed as
agents of the public, assigned the duty of assuring accurate and accountable adjudications of crime. But lack of funding and other ob54
stacles may lead defense attorneys to fall short in these public duties.

site result: prosecutors will go to trial in their strongest cases. See Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision To Go to Trial, 17
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149, 162-66 (2001) (concluding that prosecutors will only go to trial
when they think they have a strong chance of success); Gene M. Grossman & Michael
L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749 (1983) (describing
the motivation of prosecutors to go to trial only where a guilty outcome is appropriate); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON.
REV. 713, 713-28 (1988) (discussing the strength of a prosecutor’s case as a key element in the decision to offer a plea bargain).
53
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 154-55 (1997) (positing a truth-finding function as a central constitutional
value of criminal procedure); WILLIAM PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO
DO TO REBUILD IT passim (1999) (criticizing U.S. criminal procedure for placing insufficient value on the trial’s truth-finding function); Christopher A. Bracey, Book Review,
Truth and Legitimacy in the American Criminal Process, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691,
698-99 (2000) (arguing that the truth-finding capacity of police, prosecutors, and
courts is central to the public legitimacy of criminal justice).
54
See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7-13
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/
fullreport.pdf (finding that many defendants are represented by lawyers who are without adequate resources to provide effective representation); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1206-55 (1975) (discussing
the limits and the pressures put upon public defenders in plea bargaining); Ronald F.
Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 219, 221-25 (2004) (discussing the relative lack of resources provided to public
defenders and potential sources for remedy).
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Thus, there are public interests at stake in plea negotiations that
55
both parties at the table might ignore. The public’s interests in plea
discounts of the right scope can be protected best in a process that is
56
open to public scrutiny and accountability. Outsiders must be able
to estimate, based on the likely views of judges and juries who evaluate
admissible evidence, what would have occurred at trial and use that
estimate to test the predictions or calculations of the parties.
It may be impractical to make such judgments in individual cases,
for that would require access to all the witnesses and evidence that
might play out at trial. But the insistence that the parties do not always know best—central to a trial distortion theory—gets stronger
57
when observers review outcomes in many cases across time. Patterns
in outcomes can signal potentially distorting plea negotiation practices, even if the reliability of evidence from case to case is unknowable. Whatever the words that defendants utter at the plea hearings, a
system should not tolerate plea bargaining practices that distort the
outcomes that would have occurred at trial.
2. Macro-Level Social Purposes
Other approaches to guilty pleas move outside the minds of the
negotiating parties—and outside the criminal courtroom altogether—
to ask whether guilty pleas serve larger social purposes. Some writers
in this vein conclude that they do, while others judge plea bargains a
failure and call for their abolition. Despite their disparate vantage
points, these perspectives on plea bargaining share common ground:
they discuss plea bargaining as a social institution that must stand or
fall as a whole.
Crime control plays a leading role among the relevant social purposes that plea bargaining can serve. Under this approach, plea negotiations succeed if they extend the power of government to punish

55

See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1985-90
(1992) (arguing that both prosecutors and defenders may fail to internalize serious
issues of public interest in their plea negotiations); Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 1970
(noting that prosecutors and defense attorneys often agree to plea negotiations because they believe all defendants are guilty).
56
See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1410-12 (2003) (arguing in favor of greater transparency in plea
bargaining).
57
For an influential exploration of the conditions that make the parties less than
trustworthy in evaluating plea bargains, see Bibas, supra note 12, at 2470-82 (discussing
the troublesome incentives of prosecutors and defense attorneys entering plea negotiations).
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58

(and therefore to control) crime. Economic models of plea bargaining urge prosecutors to obtain as much criminal punishment as possi59
ble within a limited office budget. Social cohesion is another public
purpose used to evaluate guilty pleas. Some social historians posit that
plea bargaining allows elite social classes to soften the enforcement of
a criminal law that falls heavily on the lower social orders, and that it
60
thereby reduces social conflict.
Legal scholars who criticize plea bargains answer these claims on
several levels. First, they dispute the factual claims about the degree
of crime control or social cohesion believed to flow from plea bar61
gains.
And on a normative level, abolitionists give central impor-

58

Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176-79 (1968) (arguing that criminal law procedures that increase conviction rates make crime less economically beneficial, thereby reducing the incentive to
engage in criminal offenses); Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 289 (arguing that plea bargaining is one of several elements of the criminal justice system that set the “price” of
crime); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 113549 (1998) (discussing the taxonomy of just results theories and resource/efficiency
theories). In Zacharias’s scheme, trial distortion theory would be considered a “just
results” theory. See id. at 1135-44 (describing the premises and justifications of “just
results” theories).
59
See William Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 63-64
(1971) (noting that prosecutors must work within their offices’ budgetary constraints
to maximize the number of convictions and their resulting sentences); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, 31 RAND J. ECON.
62, 69 (2000) (treating a prosecutor’s objective as maximizing prison sentences while
minimizing the cost of prosecution). Prosecutors themselves care more about accuracy and less about maximum coverage than economic theory suggests. See DAVID T.
JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 97-98 & tbl.3.1
(2002) (describing survey responses of American and Japanese prosecutors); Brian
Forst & Kathleen B. Brosi, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEG.
STUD. 177, 178-79 (1977) (arguing that prosecutors, to obtain greater crime-rate reductions, choose to focus their resources on cases involving recidivists rather than on
those involving first-time offenders); cf. Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 340 (1990)
(concluding from statistical data that prosecutors are more concerned with ensuring
due process than maximizing conviction rates).
60
See Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the
Process of State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161, 235-37 (1999) (arguing
that plea bargaining was developed in part as an effort by the courts to include members of the lower social orders in the political system and to thus give them a better
opportunity for citizenship). For persuasive critiques of Vogel’s account, see FISHER,
supra note 22, at 11 (arguing that plea bargaining should be understood as a legal, not
social, phenomenon); Stephanos Bibas, Pleas’ Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1030
(2004) (reviewing FISHER, supra note 22).
61
See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 940 (1983) (citing the reduced duration of felony cases following the imposition of Alaska’s ban on plea bargaining as evidence that the practice does not save resources); Schulhofer, supra note

2005]

TRIAL DISTORTION AND THE END OF INNOCENCE

99

tance to lawyerly process values: even weighty social ends do not jus62
tify sordid procedural means. In utilitarian terms, it is corrosive to
ignore the question of public confidence in the quality of criminal
case outcomes.
Both the positive social purpose theories and the abolitionist critiques analyze plea bargains at a high level of abstraction. The theories
address plea bargaining as a social institution, with similar effects for
good or for ill wherever it goes. Discussion at the macro level, however, has proven useless in viable legal reform efforts, for its all-ornothing reform agenda is dispiriting in a world where plea bargaining
63
is so entrenched. Instead, we need a mid-level theory—something
between the accounts focused on the individual-case level and the social-institution level—that evaluates plea bargaining as an artifact of a
particular criminal justice system, with different features from place to
place.
A mid-level theory would offer two sorts of advantages over the
micro- and social-level accounts of plea bargaining. First, as an administrative matter, the social-purpose theories rely on evidence that is
difficult to obtain. To evaluate guilty pleas under a social-purpose
theory, we must estimate whether a society might experience more
crime or more social conflict if the law discouraged or barred certain
plea negotiations. Instead, a mid-level theory would direct us to acces64
sible sources when judging the quality of plea negotiation practices.
Such a theory would require us to examine the patterns of procedural
outcomes across the system as a whole, rather than the intentions of
the parties in particular cases or the larger social ends that guilty pleas
might achieve. In short, a mid-level theory would depend on the types
of evidence that working criminal justice professionals already routinely collect, and it asks professionals and scholars to make judgments they are competent to make.

55, at 1988 (arguing that any crime-control benefits derived from plea bargaining may
be undermined by competing economic pressures on assistant prosecutors).
62
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652,
671-77 (1981) (arguing that it is morally impermissible in Kantian terms to balance
virtues of trials against economic costs of trials).
63
See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1067-75 (discussing how plea bargaining has become entrenched despite the existence of alternative mechanisms of criminal case
resolution).
64
George Fisher presents the account of plea bargaining that most closely resembles the mid-level theory I elaborate here. Fisher rejects the social-purpose theories
and constructs an historical account of plea bargaining that looks to the evidence
available from courtroom practices. See id. at 893-936.
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The second advantage of a mid-level theory is its ability to respond
to meaningful differences among types of guilty plea practices. Public
65
attitudes reflect this divided reality, and fundamentals of human psy66
chology suggest that some plea bargains are worse than others. We
now turn to one possible mid-level indicator of troublesome negotiating practices: the number of acquittals in a jurisdiction.
II. ACQUITTALS AS A WARNING
Look around the globe, and you will find criminal justice systems
67
where extremely low rates of acquittals reveal profound trouble. In
the courts of the former Soviet Union, for example, acquittal rates
remained extremely low, largely because the judges knew that acquit68
tals threatened their career advancement. Soviet judges could not
afford to take very seriously the truth-finding function of criminal adjudication. On the other hand, remarkably low acquittal rates in
other countries inspire more confidence. The Japanese courts acquit

65

See Sergio Herzog, The Relationship Between Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness
and Support for Plea-Bargaining Practices in Israel: A Factorial-Survey Approach, 94 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 127-28 (2003) (finding that public disapproval of plea bargaining is stronger for more serious offenses).
66
See generally Bibas, supra note 12 (applying a structural-psychological perspective
to the analysis of plea bargaining and the influence of party incentives).
67
The differences in acquittal rates correlate with differences in guilty plea negotiation practices. Today, most countries with a civil law tradition do allow some form
of negotiation between the parties in criminal matters, but these countries are still less
hospitable to guilty plea negotiations than we are in the United States. See JOHNSON,
supra note 59, at 246 (noting that guilty pleas are not formally recognized in Japan and
that most cases are instead based on “confessions”); Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better
Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 344-46 (1995) (noting that while Germany does not explicitly allow plea bargaining, analogues of plea negotiations do take
place); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 208
(2004) (arguing that a comparison of the roles of American federal prosecutors and
their European counterparts in investigating, charging, and sentencing confirms that
our present system has “a decidedly administrative cast,” giving federal prosecutors all
the powers of inquisitorial prosecutors without the formal and informal limits on that
power).
68
See Peter H. Solomon, Jr., The Case of the Vanishing Acquittal: Informal Norms and
the Practice of Soviet Criminal Justice, 39 SOVIET STUD. 531, 536-38 (1987) (positing that
low acquittal rates from judges in the Soviet Union resulted from pressure from political parties that controlled nomination for judicial reelection and from oversight by
superiors).
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very few defendants, yet the review and resources devoted to each case
69
make the system a potentially positive model.
Such divergent lessons about acquittals also play out in the United
States. Low acquittal rates in some jurisdictions might reflect a tragic
indifference to the truth and the prosecutors’ determination above all
to secure convictions. Conversely, low acquittal rates might bring
positive news of prosecutors who select and prepare cases with great
care, defense attorneys who have enough time and resources to develop the best available defense, and sentencing judges who offer only
a modest benefit for pleading guilty.
So a significant drop in acquittal rates is an important event in a
criminal justice system, but it is ambiguous when it comes to the truthfinding function of the law. Lower acquittal rates should serve only as
a warning light, a reason to examine a system more closely for other
signs that the environment is compromising reliable outcomes. On
this score, the federal system reveals a point of genuine concern, because for the last twenty-five years acquittals have dropped faster than
dismissals or trial convictions.
A. Federal Acquittal Rates and the Guilty Plea Connection
It is no surprise that when guilty plea rates rise, acquittal rates fall,
and vice versa. Figure 2 shows the long-term trends for acquittals in
the federal system.

69

Acquittals in Japan remain low, perhaps, because the prosecutors have the time
and incentive to screen out their weakest cases. See JOHNSON, supra note 59, ch. 7 (arguing that the low acquittal levels in Japan arise in part from the combination of a
“conservative charging policy” and the ability of Japanese prosecutors to investigate
cases more thoroughly before charging a defendant); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53 (2001)
(“[T]he high conviction rates [in Japan] reflect case selection and low prosecutorial
budgets; understaffed prosecutors present judges with only the most obviously guilty
defendants.”). But see Hiroshi Matsubara, Trial by Prosecutor, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr.
2003, at 11, 11-12 (arguing that Japan’s high conviction rate reflects procedural injustice). For a discussion of acquittal and guilty plea rates in another common law system,
see Michael Zander, What the Annual Statistics Tell Us About Pleas and Acquittals, 1991
CRIM. L. REV. 252, 252 (noting that pleas in Great Britain went up in the 1980s from
62% to 72% of defendants, but acquittal rates stayed flat).
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Figure 2: Federal Acquittals and Mistrials in
70
Adjudicated Cases, 1945-2002 (Percent)
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During the two decades from 1951 through 1971, acquittal rates
rose to their highest post-World War II levels, up from 2.3% in 1951 to
5.5% in 1971. The years since 1971 brought acquittal rates down to
the lowest level in the history of the federal criminal justice system:
71
1% in 2002. The declines since 1989 have been particularly steep.

70

The statistics supporting this figure, which are compiled in the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1, derive from the AOUSC. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center (2003), http://f jsrc.urban.org/
noframe/download.cfm (follow the “Download Data” hyperlink; then the “Standard
Analysis Files” hyperlink; then the hyperlink for the dataset desired; and then apply the
recommended compression software to obtain data in a form suitable for processing
by statistical management software, such as SPSS or SAS). The AOUSC defines “acquittals” to include acquittals, mistrials, or verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity.
In cases of multiple counts charged against a single defendant in a case, the outcome
of the most serious charged offense is used to classify the case. Thus, a defendant who
obtains an acquittal on the most serious count and convictions on lesser counts would
be classified as an acquittal.
The vertical line on Figure 2 marks the point at which guilty pleas began a sustained climb in 1980. See Figure 1.
71
Earlier periods also saw interesting interactions between guilty pleas and acquittals. Between 1910 and 1933, as guilty plea rates climbed, the acquittal rates fell more
severely than at any other time in the century—from nearly 15% to 1.9%—continuing
a long-term slide from highs of almost 24% in the 1890s. Between 1934 and 1951,
while the guilty plea rates fell and then rose, the acquittal rates rose and then fell. See
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1.
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Although the acquittal rates show an intuitive connection with
guilty plea rates (acquittal rates go down when guilty plea rates go
up), a closer look reveals a more important and subtle feature of the
relationship: comparably high guilty plea rates do not always produce
equally low acquittal rates. The years 1951 and 2002 produced two of
the higher points in guilty plea percentages, with roughly the same
rates in both years (at 90.3% and 95.2%, respectively). Yet those same
years did not generate equally low acquittals: The acquittal rate for
72
1951 (2.3%) was over twice as high as the rate in 2002 (1%). Put in
terms of a ratio, guilty pleas outnumbered acquittals 40 to 1 in 1951,
and 93 to 1 in 2002, making the imbalance of recent years the most
extreme in the history of federal criminal justice.
Even though acquittals tend to go down when guilty pleas go up, it
is not true that higher guilty plea rates cause lower acquittal rates.
Rather, certain plea negotiation practices cause the changes in both
of these dispositions. Those times and places where the ratio between
guilty pleas and acquittals reach their highest point deserve the closest
scrutiny, for there we find the greatest risk that plea negotiations are
distorting the outcomes that would happen at trial.
B. Acquittals and the Other Displaced Outcomes
So far I have treated acquittal rates and guilty plea rates as a bilateral relationship, when in fact the relationship is multilateral. Guilty
plea rates change alongside acquittals, but they also change along with
trial convictions, dismissals by judges, and dismissals by prosecutors.
As slices of the disposition pie, acquittals, dismissals, and trial convictions all tend to shrink as the guilty plea slice grows larger, but the
amount that each shrinks is not preordained. It is possible that guilty
73
plea negotiations could affect all of the alternatives equally. But it is

Bench trial acquittal rates increased from 1982 to 2001 across all crime types. See
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 5; cf. Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal
Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 164 fig.3, 166 & fig.5 (2005) (charting
the federal bench trial conviction rates since 1946). On the other hand, from 1946 to
the early 1960s, judges had higher conviction rates than juries. See Leipold, supra, at
164 fig.3.
72
See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1.
73
For instance, imagine that a guilty plea rate of 70% occurs in Year 1 alongside
20% dismissals, 7% trial convictions, and 3% acquittals. If that guilty plea rate rises to
75% in Year 2, and simultaneously moves the dismissals down to 16.7%, the trial convictions to 5.8%, and the acquittals to 2.5%, then the growth in guilty pleas reduces
each of the alternatives in equal proportions. That is, the mix among the non-plea
outcomes remains the same; in both Year 1 and Year 2, acquittals account for 10% of
the non-plea outcomes (3 of 30 in Year 1 and 2.5 of 25 in Year 2).
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also possible that guilty pleas could displace acquittals at a faster rate
than the other non-plea outcomes, and change the mix over time. As
Figures 3 and 4 show, the acquittal slice of the pie in the federal system has been shrinking more quickly than the slices for dismissals or
trial convictions. Acquittals now occupy a smaller portion of the nonplea outcomes than at any time since the repeal of Prohibition.
Figure 3 tracks the relationship between acquittals on the one
hand and dismissals on the other, expressed as a ratio of dismissals to
acquittals. Larger numbers (higher points on the vertical axis) denote
a weakening of acquittals compared to dismissals. As the upward
movement of the graph shows, acquittals have lost ground to trial convictions and dismissals since the 1950s. Just before the rate of guilty
pleas bottomed out in the 1970s, dismissals gained ground on acquittals and the graph line moved up more steeply. The most recent decade brought the highest ratios of dismissals to acquittals.
Figure 3: Ratio of Dismissals to Acquittals
in Federal Court, 1950-2002
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Figure 4: Ratio of Trial Convictions to Acquittals
in Federal Court, 1950-2002
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Figure 4 gives us a separate picture of the acquittal-trial conviction
relationship. The graph line here also runs in a telling direction.
During the 1950s and 1960s, when guilty pleas were decreasing, acquittals gained ground on trial convictions. In recent decades, as
guilty pleas increased, trial convictions became more common than
74
acquittals and the graph line shifted higher.

74

Because dismissals and acquittals both result in non-conviction (and freedom)
for a defendant, one additional relationship among the outcomes merits attention:
the changing ratio of dismissals and acquittals on the one hand to trial convictions on
the other. A figure illustrating this relationship over time appears in the Statistical
Appendix, supra note 13, at 6.
The relationship between acquittals and dismissals was the center of attention in
Finkelstein’s 1975 analysis, supra note 14. He labeled the difference between the average acquittal and dismissal rate and a particular district’s acquittal and dismissal rate as
the “implicit non-conviction” rate, id. at 295-98, arguing that districts with belowaverage non-conviction rates would likely produce extra acquittals and dismissals if
those districts had a lower guilty plea rate. See id. at 304-09. This article was based on
an ingenious insight, and tracked federal criminal justice outcomes more thoroughly
than any study had done since the American Law Institute study in the 1930s. See ALI,
supra note 26 (studying criminal cases in thirteen federal district courts over a period
of three years).
While the idea is useful, Finkelstein’s analysis remains incomplete for purposes of
evaluating plea bargain practices. First, he did not explore in any detail the different
possible causes of below-average acquittal and dismissal rates. He used a two-variable
regression, tracking correlations between acquittals and guilty pleas without attempting to measure other differences among districts. Second, Finkelstein combined trial
convictions and guilty pleas rather than independently tracking their interaction with
acquittals and dismissals. This combination obscures the impact of guilty pleas across
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Overall, the increased prevalence of guilty pleas since the 1980s
spells danger for federal criminal justice. Guilty plea negotiations
have crowded out other alternatives, taking the heaviest toll on acquittals.
C. The Mid-Level Trial Distortion Theory
Up to this point in the Article, only a quick outline of the trial distortion theory was necessary as background to our review of guilty plea
rates and other dispositions in the federal system. More detail is now
required, however, as we sort through the possible meanings one
might attach to high guilty plea and low acquittal rates.
Trial distortion theory walks a path between the micro- and
macro-level accounts of guilty pleas. It differs from micro-level methods of evaluating guilty pleas because it examines patterns across
many cases rather than reconstructing evidence and events in particu75
lar cases. It differs from macro-level methods because it remains focused on courtroom results rather than crime control, social cohesion, or other broad-based social effects. This path between the
micro- and the macro-levels uses information readily at hand to create
a targeted critique of plea practices.
Ideally, under trial distortion theory, extra guilty pleas should
produce the same mix of convictions and non-convictions that a system would produce if every filed case either went to trial or was dis76
missed. Every person who holds a genuine factual or legal defense
to the crime as charged should either be acquitted at trial or leave the
system when the prosecutor decides not to file the charge or when the
prosecutor or judge dismisses the charge. Because such a person
should not be convicted at trial, that defendant likewise should not

all the alternative outcomes. Third, Finkelstein did not use the diagnostic tool he pioneered to find particular plea practices to regulate. Instead, he treated the presence
of “implicit non-convictions” as a basis for outright abolition of guilty pleas. Fourth,
combining dismissals and acquittals makes it difficult to interpret the meaning of
trends. Dismissals, more easily than acquittals, can be taken as a sign of increasing accuracy in a system, for reasons discussed in Part II.C.
75
A case-level effort to estimate acquittal rates that might exist in the absence of
guilty pleas appears in William M. Rhodes, Plea Bargaining: Its Effect on Sentencing and
Convictions in the District of Columbia, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1979). Rhodes
collected several case-file variables that indicate the strength of evidence in order to
estimate the probability of conviction if a defendant pleading guilty had instead gone
to trial. Id. at 364.
76
In this mental exercise, the imagined trials that the guilty pleas replace take an
average length of time based on current trial practices, supported with the personnel
and resources available for the typical trial.
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plead guilty, at least from a societal perspective where the system’s le77
gitimacy is at stake.
The theory at the bottom of this enterprise treats trial outcomes,
by definition, as truthful outcomes. Obviously, trial outcomes do not
always accurately reflect the events that occurred at the scene of the
78
crime. Nevertheless, trial distortion theory relies on the lawyerly assumption, built into the deepest convictions of the adversarial process,
that this method of ascertaining the truth is more reliable—on average across a system—than other methods of reconstructing truth after
79
the fact. In particular, this theory treats the outcome of public proceedings as presumptively more accurate than the outcome of unseen
negotiations between the parties. It also reflects the judgment that a
prosecutor’s choices about which defendants are factually guilty and
what range of punishment they deserve should be subject to evaluation by others.
1. Trial Distortion and Trial Penalties
Since the earliest public discussions of “compromises” in criminal
cases, defenders of plea bargains have argued that the negotiating
80
parties simply replicate the likely outcomes of a trial. Each party estimates the chances of conviction and the sentence a judge would
probably impose after conviction at trial. Then together they settle on
the proper amount to compensate the defendant for removing uncertainty about the outcome at trial and for saving the government and

77

See Givelber, supra note 7, at 1342-44 (discussing the problem of innocent defendants accepting guilty pleas); Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1354 (2000) (suggesting that the court should
not accept a guilty plea from a factually innocent defendant).
78
For one example of a gap between trial outcomes and truth in the real world,
see Fox Butterfield, Guns and Jeers Used by Gangs To Buy Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2005, at 1 (describing the use of intimidation to prevent gang members from cooperating with the police in drug trials in Boston).
79
For a comparison of civil- and common-law perspectives on the truth-finding
function of the trial, see Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 580-87 (1973) (“I
contend that the continental non-adversary system of procedure is more committed to
the search for truth than is the Anglo-American adversary system.”).
80
See Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1927)
(discussing the various sorts of “compromise” that represent viable alternatives to
criminal trial); Moley, supra note 20, at 123 (summarizing the arguments favoring plea
bargaining, as stated by prosecutors in the 1920s); S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Waiver
of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 MICH. L. REV. 695, 710-17 (1927) (arguing that public interest theory accepts a guilty plea as an appropriate alternative to a trial in a
criminal case).
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its witnesses the resources necessary to try the case. In this happy account of rational economic actors, the negotiations for guilty pleas
take place “in the shadow of the trial” and merely save system re81
sources.
By invoking this hoary theme in the debates about the legitimacy
of plea bargaining, I do not make any descriptive claim. Without a
doubt, some bargains do not produce results that resemble what a trial
would have produced; not all bargaining happens in the shadow of
trials. Perhaps prosecutors have their reasons to grant concessions
that are too large; perhaps defense attorneys act as unfaithful agents
82
for their clients and ask for too little. Defendants themselves might
83
poorly predict the likely outcome of a trial.
Instead, the trial distortion theory is normative: plea practices are
good to the extent that they mimic trial results, with proper routine
sentence discounts. In this view, not all guilty pleas are created equal
and not all forms of coercion used to induce a plea of guilty are
equally troubling. The coercive power of strong evidence creates no
concern. Some defendants plead guilty simply because they accept
responsibility for their crimes or recognize the futility of resisting the
government’s strong evidence. These easy cases would have produced
convictions even without the guilty pleas, but only after trials purchased at greater public expense, so the savings from the plea can be
devoted to additional criminal cases or to other social priorities.

81

For examples of discussions treating plea bargains as taking place in the shadow
of trials, see Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
509, 513 (1979) (“Any criminal defendant faces unpleasant alternatives: he can either
plead guilty or defend himself at trial.”); Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615, 632
(2002) (“[T]he prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ estimation of how a jury might decide a case becomes the benchmark against which plea bargaining takes place. . . . It is
in cases where the two sides have different expectations of a jury . . . that a trial will occur.”).
82
See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA xvii (1993) (discussing how politics can cause poor plea bargaining results
by reducing the amount of scrutiny given to individual cases); Schulhofer, supra note
55, at 1987-91 (discussing how, in the reality of plea bargaining, “[t]he real parties in
interest (the public and the defendant) are represented by agents (the prosecutor and
the defense attorney) whose goals are far from congruent with those of the principals,”
carrying “a potential for conflicts of interest”).
83
Stephanos Bibas has ably catalogued a variety of reasons—some of them built
into the institutional arrangements of the criminal courtroom, others growing out of
common human failures to process information rationally—that most plea bargains
may not accurately predict trial results. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2496-527 (analyzing
the various ways in which human psychology poses serious pitfalls for plea bargaining).
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Trial-distorting plea bargains are more likely to occur in cases
where the government has weak evidence to support the charges as
84
filed.
In these cases, the discount that a prosecutor offers might
grow quite large, because a lucrative offer is needed to convince a defendant to give up a strong chance of outright acquittal. The rational
prosecutor must set a “market-clearing” price high enough to obtain
guilty pleas even in weak cases.
One difficulty with such large plea discounts (or trial penalties) is
85
the effect they might have on defendants. The difference between
the predicted sentence after a trial conviction and the predicted sentence after a guilty plea could become so large that some defendants
would not accurately weigh their options and would not dare go to
86
trial, even with a strong defense.
More to the point, these discounts might grow so large in some
cases that they become unworthy of public support, regardless of their
84

See David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 115, 132 (1994) (“[M]any prosecutors . . . will . . . resort to offering
incredibly lenient punishments to assure the entry of guilty pleas in those weak cases
that probably would and should be lost at trials . . . .”); cf. Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 58-65 (1968) (arguing that
prosecutors seek bargains most persistently in their weakest cases to ensure some positive outcome); Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak
Cases, Prior Records, and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 261-62 (1989)
(finding that, when deciding the terms of a plea agreement, prosecutors took into account not only the strength of the evidence but also who represented the defendant).
85
See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
205, 207-09 (applying prospect theory to plea bargaining and arguing that the most
likely reason for the inapplicability of prospect theory is that prosecutors offer such a
large guilty plea bonus that it overcomes all other incentives); Hans Zeisl, The Offer
That Cannot Be Refused, in FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & RICHARD S. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 558, 559-60 (1980) (“[T]he greater the difference between the offered sentence
and the sentence expected after conviction at trial, the more defendants will plead
guilty and avoid trial.”); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 574-76 (1977) (positing that fear of a heavier sentence after
trial might lead defendants to accept virtually any offered plea bargain).
86
See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 45-53 (arguing that most plea bargains are
unconscionable because they result from unequal bargaining power and involuntary
because defendants do not understand their situation); Daniel Givelber, Punishing
Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1363, 1394-98 (2000) (noting that sentencing guidelines punish more strongly those
who claim to be innocent and that some innocent defendants will plead guilty to avoid
the possibility of that increased punishment); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A
Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011,
2012-13 (1992) (arguing that innocent defendants are more risk averse than guilty defendants and are more likely to accept a plea bargain even when a trial probably would
vindicate them).
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effect on defendants. Granted, the public normally should repay a
defendant for the savings of trial preparation and court resources that
flow from a guilty plea. The value of the savings, however, must be
discounted by the fact that a guilty plea cuts short the public’s chance
to learn details about the facts in the case because the factual basis for
the plea, as described at the plea hearing, will offer only a quick
sketch of the evidence. Prosecutors see an immediate resource savings in the office budget when a defendant pleads guilty, but they
might undervalue the need for public awareness of the details that
87
prosecutors already know about the crime and investigation. Prosecutors with such a blind spot might offer overly large discounts to the
defendant.
A guilty plea discount, in addition to rewarding the defendant for
saving the government trial resources, also reflects the uncertainty
that a defendant saves the government by pleading guilty. There are
some forms of uncertainty, however, that the public should resolve
only through a trial, even if the defendant offers to remove all risk
from the case. When a defendant accepts a steep discount to waive a
trial that carries only a remote chance of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt (say, a 20% chance), this is no cause for rejoicing. Many
features of the criminal trial, from the rules of evidence to the standard of proof, declare the importance of a high level of confidence in
88
criminal convictions. When uncertainty about the accuracy of a conviction becomes too high, the public should not be willing to accept

87

See Gifford, supra note 86, at 70-73 (describing the benefits of the trial process
for the community, and especially for the victim, affected by a given crime); Abraham
S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 49
SMU L. REV. 567, 570-77 (1996) (proposing techniques to protect the public interest
in a system given over to party initiative and party control); Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic’s Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 555, 556-57 (1979) (explaining how
the public benefits from open jury trials).
In some notorious cases that implicate the integrity of criminal justice (for instance, prosecutions of wealthy or famous defendants that raise questions about the
even-handed quality of enforcement), the public can benefit enormously from a public
airing of the alleged offense and the government’s investigation. See, e.g., Barry Meier,
2 Guilty in Fraud at a Cable Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A1 (discussing the background and verdict of the Adelphia case); Jury Finds Stewart Guilty on All Counts, L.A.
TIMES, July 9, 2004, at C2 (reporting on the verdict in Martha Stewart’s trial for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and lying to investigators). Such a public airing would
be especially important for cases filed in areas where social attitudes are in flux, such as
possession of medicinal marijuana or hate crimes.
88
Even defenses based on the likely exclusion of reliable but illegally obtained evidence should be considered in examining the necessary public confidence in criminal
proceedings. One aspect of the public legitimacy of criminal proceedings is the confidence that law enforcement officers respect the relevant legal constraints.
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89

the conviction, even when the defendant offers it.
Because the
criminal system emphasizes public responses to alleged violations of
public values, the need to demonstrate the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system must trump the preferences of defendants. At some
point, the purchase of too many uncertain convictions undermines
our confidence that the system is leading to the accurate results necessary for legitimacy.
The trial distortion theory, therefore, promotes guilty plea negotiations and sentence practices that offer only modest plea discounts
to defendants. In setting the legal requirement that a plea of guilty be
90
“voluntary,” trial distortion theory defines improper coercion to include any discounts offered in weak cases that are large enough to
91
undermine confidence in the outcome. If cases of a given evidentiary strength produce a certain pattern of trial outcomes (say, a conviction in two out of every three cases), plea negotiations should produce a similar pattern of outcomes. Better to have confidence in the
accuracy of two convictions with sentences near full strength, along
with one dismissal or acquittal, than to negotiate for three convictions
that produce weaker sentences and inspire weaker confidence.
According to these guiding principles, federal plea practices under current sentencing law present a risky proposition. Granted, the
ample resources of the federal system do allow agents to build solid
evidentiary foundations for many cases. But even in weaker cases

89

To put the point another way, while “cost bargaining” is acceptable under the
trial distortion theory, the most extreme cases of “odds bargaining” are not. See Francis
James, Effective Plea and Sentence Bargaining in South Africa, JUST ’CAUSE (Vera Inst. of
Just., New York, N.Y.), Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 3 (“[I]f accused defendants who were guilty
knew for certain the outcome of a plea of guilty, they would, in fact, plead guilty . . . .
Poorly implemented, however, plea bargaining could erode the quality of justice by
encouraging the innocent to plead guilty and undermine public confidence in the
administration of justice.”); cf. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness:
An Argument for Limited Use, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 263, 278-79 (1988) (drawing a distinction between the level of proof required at trial and the level of certainty necessary
to support the use of predictions about a defendant’s dangerousness); Moohr, supra
note 67, at 214-16 (arguing that public trials provide a rationale for sentences, educate
the business community about the illegality of specific conduct, and strengthen the
shared social norms of the business community against fraud).
90
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (“Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine
that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other
than promises in a plea agreement).”).
91
Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that the prejudicial effect of substandard attorney performance can lead to reversal when it creates
prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, and thus adopting a
standard lower than preponderance of the evidence).
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(where the risk of trial distortion is greatest), federal prosecutors have
little to fear. The penalties they can impose on defendants start well
92
above the typical penalties that most states would impose. As we will
see, current sentencing law gives prosecutors and judges many ways to
reward cooperation, yet the discounts they offer still result in sentences higher than the norm in the state system. Sentence severity in
the federal system today carries a built-in risk that the plea discount
will become too large and distort hypothetical trial outcomes.
2. Are Lost Acquittals and Dismissals Trial Distortions?
Where do acquittal rates fit into this world centered around the
hypothetical results that trials would produce? A trial distortion theory does not imply that there is a particular level of acquittals that is
healthy or unhealthy; acquittals become a point of concern not simply
when they become too high or low in absolute terms, but also when
93
they change persistently in one direction. Moreover, the meaning of
lower acquittal rates will differ from place to place. In some places,
acquittals dwindle because plea bargains are being offered and accepted in weaker cases. In other places, however, lower acquittal rates
show that prosecutorial screening and trial performance are improving.
Let us first explore the more discouraging scenario: when dropping acquittal rates show that more innocent defendants are being
convicted. The number of defendants in weak cases who accept plea
offers should rise over time if prosecutors or judges increase the trial
penalty. These increases could result from changes in the law (say,
the passage of a new mandatory-minimum sentencing law that gives

92

Although state sentences actually served tend to be lower than the federal sentences served, federal penalties in general do not exceed public expectations for punishment. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 916-19 (D. Utah 2005) (noting that penalties for some crimes under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines generally
tracked respective state sentences as well as public opinion); PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING FEDERAL CRIMES 79-81 (1995),
http://www.ussc.gov/nss/jp_ch5.pdf (summarizing survey responses regarding just
punishment for a series of hypothetical cases, and finding that the central tendency of
public opinion roughly matches guideline ranges for crimes, with exceptions for some
drug crimes, bank robbery, and some fraud offenses).
93
Movements in either direction could tell us something about the quality of results in the justice system. A sustained increase in acquittals might reveal that some
prosecutors are losing touch with the values of jurors and the community, or it could
indicate sloppy investigations. The guilty pleas resulting from such a system might deserve some special scrutiny. But the more pertinent problem in the current federal
system (and probably in many state systems, as well) is a persistent decline in acquittals.
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94

the prosecutor a new bargaining chip) or from a change in policy or
practice (perhaps an emphasis by a newly elected prosecutor on filing
95
habitual-felon charges whenever possible).
The discount can become quite large; some estimates peg the guilty plea discount at
96
roughly half the length of sentences received after conviction at trial.
Losses in at least some types of dismissals might also indicate trial
distortion at work. Dismissals include decisions by judges to terminate
a case before the end of trial because of inadequate evidence or some
other problem. These dismissals are functionally similar to acquittals,

94

See Drug Mandatory Minimums: Are They Working?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th
Cong. 62 (2000) (statement of John Roth, Chief, Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice) (stating that mandatory-minimum sentences for
drug crimes provide “an indispensable tool for prosecutors” to induce defendants to
cooperate).
95
For an example of the range of charges available to a federal prosecutor to respond to a given set of facts, consider the case of Nathaniel Heatwole. This student at
the Quaker-affiliated Guilford College hid box cutters on airplanes to expose weaknesses in airport security. Federal prosecutors originally charged him with a felony
(taking a dangerous weapon aboard an aircraft) with a ten-year maximum sentence.
After plea negotiations, prosecutors changed that charge to a misdemeanor with a
maximum penalty of six months in prison and a $5,000 fine. Associated Press, Box Cutter Student Cops Plea, Makes Video to Aid Screeners, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2004-04-24-box-cutters_x.htm. He was ultimately sentenced to two years supervised probation, 100 hours of community service,
and a $500 fine. Associated Press, Student in Box-Cutter Case Gets Probation, NEWSMAX.COM, June 24, 2004, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/6/24/
122102.shtml.
96
For estimates of the size of the trial penalty, see David Brereton & Jonathan D.
Casper, Does It Pay To Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal
Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45, 55-56 (1981); Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 316-19 (1993) (finding that defendants found guilty at trial were
significantly more likely to receive a prison sentence than those who pled guilty);
Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty
Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 973-75
(2005) (estimating the guilty plea discount for different crime types); Thomas M.
Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, “He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His”: An Analysis of Judicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 327-37 (1980)
(presenting the occurrence of a guilty plea discount in Metro City data); Hans Zeisel,
The Disposition of Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 407, 444-49 (estimating, in
one selection of cases, a 42% increase in severity from sentences offered in exchange
for guilty pleas to those eventually imposed following trial); Comment, The Influence of
the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 207 (1956)
(“[Judges’] estimates of the extent to which the fine or prison term was diminished for
a defendant pleading guilty varied from 10 to 95 per cent of the punishment which
would ordinarily be given after trial and conviction.” (footnote omitted)).
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so a decrease in this type of dismissal would mean roughly the same
97
thing to defendants as a decrease in acquittals.
Dismissals also include decisions by prosecutors to terminate cases
early. Prosecutors commonly dismiss a case after reviewing the file or
interviewing the witnesses and realizing that the preliminary reading
of the evidence was overly optimistic. If guilty pleas replace dismissals
that correct such inadvertent overcharges, they distort the outcomes
that would have emerged from the trial process.
Dismissals could also happen when a prosecutor finds it necessary
to correct a deliberate overcharge. Under this scenario, after a prosecutor asks for a plea of guilty to an untenable charge (“It never hurts to
ask”), the defendant is not fooled and declines the offer, and the
98
prosecutor gives up on the ruse and dismisses the case. A decline in
this type of prosecutor dismissal could indicate that more defendants
are taken in by the maneuver (and are pleading guilty to unfounded
99
charges), a troubling prospect under the trial distortion theory. But
a decline in dismissals might also indicate that prosecutors are making
fewer of these gambits in the first place, which would be good news
for trial distortion purposes. Thus, given these various sub-types that
point in different directions, dismissals send out even more ambiguous trial-distorting signals than acquittals do.
3. The Accuracy Hypothesis
As we have seen, there is an alternative explanation for declines in
both acquittals and dismissals, one with more benign implications
than a trial distortion theory. Instead of postulating that fewer acquittals result from more defendants abandoning viable defenses because
of a higher trial penalty, such lower acquittal rates might simply mean
that the quality of cases filed is improving over time. This “accuracy
hypothesis” could prove true if prosecutors screen cases more care97

Acquittals have different appeal and double jeopardy consequences than some
dismissals by judges. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1892) (finding
that following the acquittal of a defendant, the State can neither appeal nor seek a new
trial).
98
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (“The prosecutor in a criminal
case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause . . . .”).
99
See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 740-41, 75058 (2001) (criticizing bargains for pleas of guilty to nonexistent, inapplicable, or timebarred crimes, and arguing that judges should reject those bargains). If the prosecutor overcharges the case but the defendant ultimately pleads guilty to a lesser charge to
which she has no viable defense, then the prosecutor’s charging decision amounted to
harmless error and the case presents no problems for trial distortion purposes.
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fully as they enter the system or if investigators assemble stronger cases
100
in the first place.
It could also happen if prosecutors solidify cases
101
after they are filed through more complete preparation for trial.
If
cases were strengthened in this way, a drop in the acquittal rate would
accurately reflect the government’s better prospects at trial, and
would not indicate any distortion of trial outcomes during plea nego102
tiations.
A prosecutor’s office that receives more resources (whether it be
new funding from the legislature or more available hours because
fewer existing cases go to trial) could spend those resources either on
extra quantity or on extra quality. When the new resources buy extra
quantity, newly added cases are likely to involve less serious crimes or
less persuasive evidence, because the office would have already se103
lected the highest priority cases with the first available funds.
When new resources buy extra quality, however, the system outcomes change to reflect the better truth-finding function of the system. Improvements in case screening would shift careful prosecutorial scrutiny of the case to the pre-charge stage and would
104
consequently drive down the dismissal rates.
An investment in
higher-quality case screening might also lead to lower acquittal rates.

100

See Wright & Miller, supra note 23, at 116-17 (concluding that principled
screening in New Orleans created positive outcomes while reducing reliance on plea
bargains); Note, The Elimination of Plea Bargaining in Black Hawk County: A Case Study,
60 IOWA L. REV. 1053, 1066-69 (1975) (finding that improved screening in an Iowa
county accounted for the fact that, despite the elimination of guilty pleas, the conviction rate remained unchanged).
101
See Bruce H. Kobayashi & John R. Lott, Jr., In Defense of Criminal Defense Expenditures and Plea Bargaining, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 397, 407-11 (1996) (finding that appropriate prosecutorial preparation leads to guilty defendants receiving more overall
punishment than innocent defendants).
102
See Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 306-07 (noting that acquittal and dismissal
rates in different districts are based on a similar mix of crimes charged). But cf. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 28 n.151 (discussing Finkelstein’s failure to examine in depth
the possible differences in charging and evidentiary quality from district to district).
103
See Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 181-83 (2004) (arguing
that the increased number of environmental prosecutions likely reflects the fact that
more marginal cases are being brought). The new cases added with the additional resources will not necessarily be the least serious in the mix, if the resources arrive as
perceptions are shifting about which crimes are serious. For instance, if methamphetamine cases receive higher priority just as prosecutors find extra resources to devote to them, the new cases will not be perceived as the least serious charged.
104
If a prosecutor’s office adopts poor screening structures, a case that is too weak
might get filed before the prosecutor reviews it carefully. When an overworked prosecutor finally turns to the case for trial preparation and discovers its weaknesses, dismissal is a better option than going to trial with only slim chances of success.
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Roughly speaking, stronger cases selected at the start should produce
105
stronger results at trial for the government.
Similarly, if improved
preparation reveals flaws in the evidence that can be remedied (for
instance, a witness who needs additional documentary support to tell
106
the truth convincingly) the acquittal rate should go down.
Thus, the tradeoff between quantity and quality of cases could offer an important clue as to whether dropping acquittals in a particular
system present good news (the accuracy hypothesis) or bad news (trial
distortion). Based on this criterion, it appears that the most recent
era in federal criminal justice is the most worrisome, for reasons we
will now explore.
III. WHAT MADE FEDERAL ACQUITTALS DISAPPEAR?
So far, I have argued that the combination of higher guilty plea
rates and lower rates of acquittal in a jurisdiction creates a real source
of concern. Why did these outcomes shift over time in the federal system? In this section, I concentrate on the most likely causes for two
eras of noteworthy change: the guilty plea decreases of the 1950s and
1960s and the guilty plea increases from the 1980s to the present.
Part IV will narrow the focus to consider in more detail the troubling
developments in the most recent decade.
The causation story changes as we move from one era to the next.
Some earlier changes in guilty plea and acquittal rates may have reflected an increasingly accurate system, probably based on improvements in access to defense counsel and lower workloads for judges.
Developments in the last twenty-five years, however, were more likely
the result of prosecutorial negotiation techniques that distorted trial
105

It is possible that high-quality case screening can coexist with high acquittal
rates. Some prosecutors’ offices that set consistently demanding standards for the filing of cases nevertheless take some calculated risks and lose a relatively large number
of cases at trial. See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 23, at 76-77 (describing the relatively high rate of acquittals in New Orleans).
106
If extra trial preparation reveals fatal flaws in more cases, it would probably increase the dismissal rate because the prosecutor would not often forge ahead to try a
hopeless case.
Economic theory might suggest that prosecutors probably devote more marginal
new resources to case screening and negotiating efforts than to improved trial preparation. Attorneys always give high priority to trial preparation because trials are such
visible events with an impact on the prosecutor’s professional reputation; put in economic terms, trial preparation resembles a fixed cost, while the quality of case screening and the quantity of cases reviewed for possible charges both look more like variable
costs. Cf. Lynch, supra note 84, at 130-31 (arguing that lawyers may rise to the occasion
when in the constructively adversarial environment of a trial, but that more variation
exists in the quality of counsel during plea negotiations).
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outcomes. In particular, federal sentencing law over those decades
changed to give prosecutors and judges greater ability to impose an
ever larger and more certain penalty on defendants who go to trial. It
has become far too costly in federal court to claim and prove innocence.
A. Case Volume
The volume of defendants and cases passing through American
107
criminal justice systems increased throughout the twentieth century.
As time in the criminal courtroom grew scarcer, a major time-saver
grew to dominate the system. Not surprisingly, then, many historians
of plea bargaining point to rising workloads of criminal justice actors
108
as the best explanation for their embrace of plea bargains.
In the federal system, this account holds some weight, but the role
of case volume and workload is complex. Once we adjust for the increasing number of judges and prosecutors assigned to the system
over the years, we see that case volume has had mixed effects on guilty
plea and acquittal rates. As the discussion in this section demonstrates, a lighter workload for judges over the years produced fewer
guilty pleas and more acquittals, but lighter workloads for prosecutors
over time led to just the opposite result: more guilty pleas and fewer
acquittals.
We can explore caseload at the simplest level by tracing the volume of cases moving through the system each year. In gross terms,
higher federal case volume did seem to produce higher guilty plea
rates. The increases in guilty plea rates that began in the 1980s hap107

See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE
RULE OF LAW 29-30 (1996) (providing statistics indicating both increased crime and
increased incarceration).
108
See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 574-77 (identifying a German statute
“designed specifically to . . . alleviate the workload of judges and prosecutors,” which
“significantly contributed to the expansion of plea bargaining”); Fisher, supra note 11,
at 865 (noting that prosecutors in the nineteenth century “plea bargained to ease their
crushing workloads”); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 286 (1972)
(arguing that plea bargaining is necessary because the American system renders it
“impossible for every defendant to claim his right to a jury trial”). For the view repudiating the importance of caseload, see Jo Dixon, The Organizational Context of Criminal
Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157, 1177 (1995) for examples of studies demonstrating
that plea rates are unrelated to caseload; also useful is Stephen P. Lagoy et al., An Empirical Study on Information Usage for Prosecutorial Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 435, 462 (1976), which provides, “It appears that where case load
pressures were less, there was actually a greater probability of the acceptance of a plea
bargain.”
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pened alongside annual increases in the number of defendants mov109
ing through the system.
At first glance, the connection is also fairly
strong between case volume and acquittal rates. The last three decades have been typical: as case volume increased, acquittals de110
creased.
Despite the apparent connection between volume on the one
hand and acquittal and guilty plea rates on the other, raw case volume
is a misleading proxy for the caseloads that prosecutors and judges actually face when processing cases. As the total volume in the system
increases, legislatures periodically add capacity to the system by fund111
ing new prosecutors and judges.
Thus, a doubling of the case volume might produce no real change in the caseload for individuals if
the number of prosecutors and judges also eventually doubles.
The connection between case volume and guilty plea rates and
acquittal rates weakens substantially after adjusting the annual criminal caseload in light of the number of federal judges and prosecutors
at work in those years. The spectacular influx of cases during Prohibition, however, did produce a link between increased workload and
decreased acquittals. During those thirteen years, the number of
prosecutors and judges never had time to catch up with the increase
112
in cases. During later periods, however, when the growth in volume
109

The number of defendants in terminated cases rose from 44,585 in 1971 to
78,835 in 2002. The correlation over time between guilty plea rates and sheer volume,
however, is not perfect. For instance, the volume of defendants stayed fairly steady
from 1951 to 1971, when guilty plea rates dropped and acquittal rates climbed back
up. By 1956, the caseload was between 30,000 and 40,000 defendants, where it remained even during the long slide in guilty pleas until 1971. Guilty plea rates and volume figures part ways at other points as well. In the period before Prohibition, guilty
plea rates actually began their steep climb in 1912, before volume had picked up very
much. See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1.
One statistical measure of the match between two sets of numbers, a Pearson’s
correlation coefficient, was moderately strong for the overall period, 1910-2002, at
0.54.
110
The correlation between acquittal rates and volume of cases terminated during
the period from 1910 to 2002 equals -0.73; the correlation for the period from 1945 to
2002 is similarly strong, at -0.74.
111
Cf. Richard T. Boylan, Fiscal Federalism and the War on Drugs 1 (Nov. 29, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=474161 (discussing how “a higher fraction
of drug incarcerations are federal in states . . . with lower per-capita income,” indicating that these states are less capable of prosecuting drug cases at the state level).
112
See ALI, supra note 26, at 57 (explaining that during Prohibition, the criminal
justice system was “not geared to handle this increase in business”); Alschuler, supra
note 19, at 32 (suggesting that the end of Prohibition might explain the drop in guilty
pleas between 1920 and 1936); John F. Padgett, Plea Bargaining and Prohibition in the
Federal Courts, 1908-1934, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 413, 419-24 (1990) (discussing “guilty
pleas as a response to caseload” before and during Prohibition).
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was more incremental and allowed the addition of new judgeships and
prosecutor positions, volume had much weaker effects. Surprisingly,
the average number of cases terminated per judge and per prosecutor
declined over the years because the number of new judges and prosecutors outpaced the rise in case volume.
In the specific context of judicial criminal caseload, the average
number of criminal cases terminated per district court judge declined
consistently from 1950 to 1981 and then rose modestly during the last
113
two decades, as Table 2 shows.
When judges had more time to devote to criminal cases, the guilty plea rate tended to fall and the acquittal rate tended to rise: the judicial workload fell along with the
guilty plea rate from the 1950s through the 1970s. The gentle rise in
the judicial criminal caseload since 1981 corresponded with the large
increase in the guilty plea rate and large decrease in the acquittal
114
rate.

113

The criminal cases flowing through the federal courts are not the only source
of caseload pressure. Particularly for the judges, an expanding civil docket creates
pressure to dispose of all cases more quickly. Fisher, supra note 11, at 867 (“As judges
devoted a hugely increasing proportion of their time to the civil caseload, they devoted
a shrinking proportion to the criminal caseload, and they resolved more and more
criminal cases by guilty plea.”). The number of civil cases filed has increased more
quickly than the number of cases on the criminal docket over the last sixty years, possibly causing judges to be more amenable to guilty pleas in order to clear their criminal
dockets more efficiently. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 492
(2004) (noting the disparity in the two dockets’ increase, and suggesting a causal connection between the more dramatic increase in civil caseloads and guilty pleas).
Between 1945 and 2002, the combined caseload per judge fluctuated several
times. Between 1945 and 1968, the combined judicial caseload dropped from 542 to a
low of 311. The caseload then increased for a time, up to a high of 640 in 1985, before
dropping back to around 550 in the last few years. More detailed combined caseload
numbers appear in the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 3.
The match between these combined judicial caseloads and guilty plea rates is tolerably good, but imperfect. The long decline in guilty pleas from 1951 to 1971 mostly
coincided with a decreased judicial caseload, and the first half of the sustained rise in
guilty pleas during the last three decades matched a rise in the judicial caseload.
When judges had more time for each case, apparently they did not encourage guilty
pleas so strongly. Since 1985, however, the connection between these factors has disappeared. See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 3.
114
More specific judicial criminal workload numbers appear in the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 3.
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Table 2: Criminal Cases Terminated per Judge and
per Prosecutor in Federal Courts, 1950-2000

1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

Cases per
Prosecutor

Cases per
Judge

----51
50
37
33
19
21
19
13
15

183
171
137
117
111
128
76
95
106
91
123

The match, however, between judicial criminal caseload on the
one side and guilty plea or acquittal rates on the other side is imperfect. Some years were mismatches; in addition, the guilty plea and acquittal rate changes over the last two decades were much stronger
than the gradual increases in judicial criminal caseloads. Overall,
there was only a weak correlation between judicial criminal caseload
115
on the one hand and guilty plea or acquittal rates on the other.
Although the fact is counterintuitive, the criminal caseload of
prosecutors also appears to have become lighter over the last four
decades. Unlike the judicial caseload, which fluctuated over time, the
prosecutor caseload fell pretty steadily during the last half of the twentieth century. The average number of criminal cases terminated per
prosecutor was about fifty-five in 1958, but, as Table 2 shows, by 1980
it was down to nineteen, in the same neighborhood as the current fig116
ure.
Thus, the expansion in the number of federal criminal prose-

115

Between 1945 and 2002, the correlation coefficient between judicial criminal
caseload and the guilty plea rate was 0.20; the correlation between judicial criminal
caseload and the acquittal rate was - 0.15.
116
The number of Assistant U.S. Attorneys rose from 582 in 1958 to 5304 in 2002.
See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 3. More specific prosecutor workload
numbers appear in the Statistical Appendix. Id. The workload calculation used here
(total number of cases terminated in a year divided by the average number of Assistant
U.S. Attorneys employed during that year) is imperfect because it includes both civil
and criminal litigators, but a more precise breakdown is not available for a long span
of years. For an example of a similar calculation, see Michael Edmund O’Neill, When
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cutors more than compensated for the increased criminal case volume
117
in the federal courts over the years.
New prosecutor positions outpaced new case volume from the
1950s to 1990, meaning that prosecutors had more time to devote to
each case on average. Perhaps the new resources went into higher
118
quality rather than greater quantity of cases.
Two time periods,
however, cast a more negative light on the effect of prosecutor
caseloads. First, prosecutor caseloads fell even during periods when
acquittal rates rose, such as the 1960s. Second, prosecutor caseloads
stayed constant from 1990 to the present, a period of sharply falling
119
acquittal rates.
These patterns do not speak well for the accuracy hypothesis.
Since acquittal rates increased during some periods when the overall
prosecutor caseload decreased, it is difficult to maintain that federal
prosecutors used their extra time to produce more accurate results
through screening cases more accurately or preparing more thoroughly for trial. Moreover, since caseloads stayed flat during the most
recent drop in acquittal rates, it is hard to believe that extra prosecutor efforts in each case produced more accurate outcomes during this
period.

Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221,
258-59 (2004) (combining both civil and criminal litigators).
117
The effect of the increasing civil docket on plea bargaining could also reach
prosecutors, although the impact should be slight, as the U.S. Attorneys’ offices devote
separate staff to civil litigation. When we count only civil cases involving the government as a litigant, civil and criminal cases per prosecutor decreased from the 1950s to
1974, increased for the next decade, and then decreased again from 1985 to 2002.
Again, as with the criminal caseload, the decline in combined caseload per prosecutor
happened early, and flattened out in recent years. See Statistical Appendix, supra note
13, at app. 3.
118
A law enforcement agency such as the FBI might also aim for quality over quantity, meaning that as the cases get more factually complex and varied, the amount of
time needed to reach a minimum level of competence for each case increases. See, e.g.,
M. Elaine Nugent & Mark L. Miller, Basic Factors in Determining Prosecutor Workload,
PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 2002, at 32, 36 (concluding that criminal cases with “complications” have longer “case processing times”); cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE 194-95 (1981) (concluding that the increased rate in
plea bargains resulted from the professionalization of police and prosecutors and from
increased reliance on law enforcement); Padgett, supra note 112, at 441-44 (stating
that the professionalization of the FBI during the 1920s led to stronger evidence and
contributed to declining acquittal rates in that decade).
119
Prosecutor workloads correlated more strongly than judicial criminal workloads with guilty plea and acquittal rates. The correlation between prosecutor caseload
and guilty plea rates for the period from 1958 to 2002 was moderately strong, at -0.45.
The correlation between prosecutor workload and acquittals was even stronger, at
0.62.
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B. Legal Complexity and Defense Counsel in the 1950s and 1960s
The legal tools available to criminal judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers change over time. When legal rules change to create
more cumbersome trials, in theory guilty plea rates should rise because the legal actors (especially the prosecutors and judges) have
120
greater incentive to avoid trials.
These general observations about criminal adjudication, however,
did not play out as predicted in the federal system. The federal
criminal court rules became more complex during the 1950s and
1960s, but the rule changes that made trials more expensive actually
contributed to rising trial rates and acquittals during that era. The
most important legal changes of that era, especially the widespread
availability of defense counsel, gave more complete information to defendants about the strength of the government’s case and made a
threat to go to trial more credible.
During some earlier eras in federal criminal justice, simpler legal
rules made it possible to conduct cheaper trials, and more trials did
121
result, just as one might predict.
But the profound legal changes
that reshaped federal criminal justice in the 1950s and 1960s also
made it clear that some forms of procedural complexity—laws that
make trials more expensive—can nevertheless cause trial rates to go
up. The longest sustained rise in federal criminal trial rates happened

120

See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(b) (4th ed.
2004) (listing “the broadening of the right to counsel” and “the due process revolution” among the reasons for the expansion of guilty pleas); Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal
Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Process: The Origins of Plea Bargaining, 31
ISRAEL L. REV. 183, 218 (1997) (finding that “as trials became more vigorous and complex, lawyers came to rely on an alternative, the guilty plea”); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 264 (1979) (describing the relative simplicity of trials in the time before plea bargaining became
common); see also David L. Cook et al., Criminal Caseload in U.S. District Courts: More
Than Meets the Eye, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1579, 1593-94 (1995) (suggesting that the number
of criminal cases understates true workload because criminal cases have become more
lengthy).
121
See Alschuler, supra note 19, at 42 (“The simpler and more straightforward the
trial process, the more likely it is that the process will be used.”). Bench trials, which
are usually simpler and less expensive than jury trials, became available in the federal
courts in the 1930s, a time when guilty plea rates did fall. See Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (holding that the defendant may waive her constitutional
right to a jury trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (stating that if a defendant is entitled to a
jury trial, the defendant must have such a trial unless the defendant waives it in writing,
the government consents, and the court approves). However, the simplifying effect of
federal bench trials did not last long, and by the 1940s guilty pleas increased again
even while the number of bench trials continued at their previous levels. See Statistical
Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 5.
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between 1951 and 1971. During these same years, the Warren Court
reinterpreted the Constitution to provide federal defendants with several new claims to raise before trial, relating to searches, seizures, in122
terrogations, and identifications.
These changes to the governing
trial procedures had some effect on the cost of trials, as seen through
an increase in the average length of a federal trial as the decades
123
passed.
Although many legal changes contributed to the length and complexity of trials, the right to defense counsel in particular probably
helped decrease the guilty plea rates for a time. The drop in guilty
plea rates between 1951 and 1971 coincided with the emergence of
the right to defense counsel in routine federal criminal cases. This
right to appointed counsel in federal court, first recognized as a con124
stitutional requirement in 1938, did not become an everyday reality
until more than two decades passed. Federal defendants who could
not afford an attorney (an estimated one-third to one-half of all fed125
eral defendants at that time) received appointed lawyers, but those
lawyers received neither compensation nor funds to pay for expert

122

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (enforcing the exclusion of evidence obtained by unlawful seizure); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966)
(ruling that an individual held for interrogation must be informed of her right to consult with an attorney and to have the attorney present during police interrogation);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (requiring court scrutiny of all pretrial confrontations of the accused to determine if presence of counsel is necessary for
a fair trial); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969) (reinforcing a high
standard of accuracy in identifications); cf. Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to State Criminal Justice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1432-38 (2002)
(explaining how the Warren Court forced a shift in police practices and courtroom
customs).
123
In the 1950s, criminal trials averaged less than two days each. The average increased through the years to a high of 3.48 days in 1997, before falling slightly over the
last five years. Estimates of trial length, based on data from the AOUSC, appear in the
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13. But the longer criminal trials in federal court occurred during both the increases and the decreases in the guilty plea rates. They also
occurred regardless of whether acquittal rates were high or low.
124
Although a 1790 statute provided for appointed counsel in some capital cases,
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. IX, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118, the constitutional requirement was
not announced until Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938). See also Evans v. Rives,
126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (holding that the right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions is not limited to felonies); David Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REV. 559, 561-62 (1951) (discussing the legal evolution
of the right to counsel in criminal cases).
125
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 (1966) (instituting the appointment of lawyers for the indigent in all stages of a criminal proceeding); see also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16-17 (1963) [hereinafter COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY] (providing results of a
study on provision of appointed lawyers).
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witnesses, investigators, or other defense services. The lawyers were
also appointed to the case at arraignment, after several important
126
events in the case had already transpired.
The formal right to federal defense counsel became more meaningful in 1964 with the passage of legislation authorizing and funding
127
a national system of federal public defenders and panel attorneys.
As more federal defendants gained practical access to compensated
defense lawyers for the first time, they became more likely to go to
128
trial.
The appointed lawyers helped argue for lower bail and ad129
vised some defendants during preliminary hearings.
Defense attorneys also provided more defendants with an independent estimate of
their odds of victory at trial; in addition, the availability of investiga130
tors and experts actually increased their odds of acquittal.
Another legal tool strengthened the position of defendants during
this time and may have empowered them to go to trial more often.
Congress passed the Bail Reform Act in 1966, which made it easier for
131
federal defendants to gain their release from detention before trial.
Because defendants who remain in detention before trial are more
anxious to resolve their cases, they plead guilty more often than defendants who are released pending trial; additionally, because detained defendants cannot assist their attorneys in locating witnesses
132
and evidence, their chances of acquittal are lower. Thus, changes in
pretrial release practices could have contributed to the decrease in

126

See COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY, supra note 125, at 24 (highlighting the strategic importance of counsel’s presence in early stages of the trial).
127
Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 3006A, 78 Stat. 552.
128
See COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY, supra note 125, at 19. The rising trial rates
(and corresponding drop in guilty plea rates) during this period are depicted in Figure 1. See also Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1. The federal experience
appears to conflict with Malcolm Feeley’s thesis that plea negotiations increase when
more defendants have access to defense attorneys. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338, 340 (1982) (arguing that as
resources, including defense counsel, have become more accessible to the accused, the
opportunity for negotiation has also increased).
129
See COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY, supra note 125, at 24 (discussing the trialoriented role defense counsel can play in earlier stages in the proceedings).
130
Id. at 26-29.
131
18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (2000).
132
See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 237 (1968) (“The fact that a defendant has been detained pending trial should
not be allowed to prejudice him at the time of trial or sentencing.”); VERA INSTITUTE,
TEN YEAR REPORT, 1961-1971, at 18 (1972) (“[T]he detainee is more apt to be convicted than if he were free on bail . . . .”); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1048 (1954) (discussing the
negative effects on preparation for trial when a defendant cannot post bail).
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guilty pleas and the increase in acquittals during the late 1960s (although both of these trends began well before the passage of the bail
133
statute). Similarly, the arrival of pretrial detention under legislation
passed in 1984 and upheld three years later against constitutional at134
tack may have contributed slightly to the increased guilty plea rates
and decreased acquittal rates of the 1980s and 1990s (although the
rates started moving a few years before the bail reform statute took effect).
It thus appears that many of the same legal changes that made
federal trials longer and more complex also made acquittals more realistic for defendants. In particular, the increased prevalence of defense counsel made defendants better informed and less desperate
during plea negotiations. These changes in the adversarial testing of
each case, in turn, likely improved the accuracy of outcomes in the
federal system during the 1960s and 1970s.
C. Crime of the Decade
The federal criminal code, even more than state criminal codes,
135
has expanded to cover more and more conduct over the years.
But
the real footprint of federal criminal justice is measured not by the
reach of the code, but by the number and type of cases actually filed.

133

See DANIEL J. FREED & PATRICIA M. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (Nat’l
Conf. on Bail and Criminal Justice: May 26-29, 1964) (showing that 60% of recommended parolees in New York were acquitted as opposed to the mere 23% of those
who were not recommended).
134
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-54 (1984); see Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 755
(1987) (holding that the “provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of
1984 fall within [the] carefully limited” category of acceptable instances of detention).
135
See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7-11 (1997) (revealing that more than 40% of federal criminal statutes were enacted over the past thirty
years); John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime Legislation 5
(2004) http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/criminallaw/
crimreportfinal.pdf (discussing an ABA report that documents an “explosive growth”
in federal criminal law since 1970); 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, in WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS, July 1, 1990,
at 1, 23-39 (attributing the judicial caseload spiral to the recent broad range of statutes
creating or implying new federal causes of action); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice:
The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 645 (1997) (discussing the encroachment of the federal criminal code on state criminal laws); L.B. Schwartz, Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 65 (1948)
(discussing the extension of federal law into the traditional state realm); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 517
(2001) (arguing that federal criminal law “probably covers more conduct . . . than any
state criminal code”).
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There are certain constants in the mix of crimes that attract the
attention of federal prosecutors. Various forms of fraud and theft
have remained staples of the federal docket, occupying between 20%
136
and 35% of the cases filed over the last six decades. But as criminal
behavior changes or (more likely) as the priorities of U.S. Attorneys
change, the federal criminal docket evolves to reflect these changes as
137
the generations pass.
The shifting mix of crimes prosecuted helps explain the peaks
and valleys in the rates of guilty pleas and acquittals. Some crimes are
simply easier to prove than others, and some investigating agencies
may be especially efficient at assembling the necessary facts to support
138
a criminal conviction. Whatever the precise reason, a change in the
number of certain crimes can shift the overall trends in guilty pleas or
acquittals.
The liquor cases filed between 1920 and 1933 offer one possible
explanation for a period of high guilty plea rates and low acquittal
139
rates.
In one sense, the liquor cases were not radically different
from other federal cases, as they produced acquittal rates and guilty
plea rates virtually identical to those seen in the rest of the federal
140
criminal docket.
However, the differential between the sentence
imposed after trial and the sentence imposed after a guilty plea (a
rough approximation of the trial penalty) was distinct from that of the
other cases in the federal docket. The proportion of liquor defendants receiving a prison sentence rose by 28 percentage points when

136

For the precise figures, see the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13. See also
Cook et al., supra note 120, at 1586 (showing that forgery and counterfeiting cases declined dramatically from 1972 to 1994).
137
For a discussion of the quantity of immigration, automobile theft, bank robbery, and weapons crimes on the federal criminal docket during different eras, see the
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 4. Since 1995, immigration cases have become more prominent and the high guilty plea rate and low acquittal rate for those
cases have shifted the overall case mix. From 1960 to 1980, relatively simple Dyer Act
prosecutions had some influence on the criminal docket.
138
Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 247, 257 (1979) (arguing that plea bargaining resulted less from caseload
pressures than from increased quality of proof as a consequence of professionalization
of prosecutors and police).
139
See H.R. REP. NO. 71-722, at 56 (1931) (discussing plea bargains in the federal
system made necessary by caseload pressures); Rubin, supra note 26, at 496-97 (analyzing the number of criminal prosecutions for violations of the Prohibition Act). The
National Prohibition Act used to be at 27 U.S.C. § 1 (1919) (repealed 1935).
140
Based on a sample of cases from thirteen districts, 2.3% of terminated liquor
cases ended in acquittals, versus 2.9% of terminated non-liquor cases. Comparable
numbers also appear for guilty pleas, with 72.6% of liquor cases ending in guilty pleas,
versus 72.5% of all other cases. ALI, supra note 26, at 115.
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the defendants went to trial; for the non-liquor defendants, the sen141
tence increased by only 7 points.
These are evocative numbers when viewed through the lens of
trial distortion theory. Apparently, in the liquor cases, federal prosecutors had to offer larger concessions in their recommended sentences before defendants would give up their valuable trial rights. It is
possible that the jury appeal of the liquor cases made them systematically weaker than other federal cases. If that was the case, the offers of
greater discounts in liquor cases helped to suppress what otherwise
might have been a substantial increase in the acquittal rate.
Like the liquor cases, federal narcotics cases also varied in impor142
tant ways over the years.
The proportion of the federal criminal
docket devoted to narcotics cases grew spectacularly in the last half of
the twentieth century, with more than a six-fold increase over five dec143
ades.
When narcotics crimes constituted a smaller part of the docket,
defendants were especially likely to go to trial. In 1951, about 75% of
the drug defendants ended their cases in guilty pleas, compared to
83% of the total defendant population. During the 1950s and 1960s,
the guilty plea rate for drug cases stayed below the rates for other
144
types of crimes, even as the overall rates declined.
But when the
guilty plea rates for non-drug crimes rose again in the early 1970s, the
plea rates for drug cases increased more quickly and drew closer to
145
the norm.
Thus, as the drug cases asserted a larger and larger role
141

Id. at 141. The percentage of sentences involving imprisonment for non-liquor
convictions was 82.1% after trial and 75.6% after a guilty plea. For liquor convictions
the percentage was 62.4% after trial and 34.5% after a guilty plea. Id.
142
See Cook et al., supra note 120, at 1583-90 (showing that drug cases fell from
1973 to 1980, but rose from 1980 to 1994).
143
These crimes accounted for 6% of the defendants on the federal docket in
1951, 12% in 1971 (after the passage of a new anti-drug statute in 1970), 21% in 1973,
30% in 1988, and 37% in 2002. Narcotics cases are now the largest single category of
crime type. Note also that the mix of drug cases shifted decisively over time from possession to distribution cases. See Cook et al., supra note 120, at 1586-87 (showing that
while possession filings decreased from 17% to 14% from 1972 to 1994, distribution
offenses now make up 74% of all drug cases).
144
More details about the guilty plea rates in narcotics cases, compared to the rest
of the pool, appear in the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 4. The guilty
plea rate was 63% in 1956 and 64% in 1961. Id.; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 187285, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENDERS, 1999: WITH TRENDS
1984-1999, at 8 (2001) (noting that 95% of those defendants charged with a drug offense pled guilty to at least one charge).
145
Frank Bowman and Michael Heise noted an increased guilty plea rate in drug
cases in the 1990s. Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining
Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1104-05 (2001)
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in the federal docket, the guilty plea rate for those crimes also came
much closer to matching the plea rate for other federal crimes.
The odds of acquittal in narcotics cases also shifted over time. In
1950, federal drug cases produced an acquittal rate above the norm
for that year: 3.3% of narcotics cases versus 2.4% of federal cases
overall. Today, drug cases are less likely than the standard federal
case to end with an acquittal: 0.6% for drug cases versus 0.9% overall
146
for 2002.
Plainly, something happened to federal drug crimes over the
years. They became much more numerous, harder for defendants to
147
win, and more likely to end with a guilty plea.
The narcotics cases,
like the liquor cases in earlier days, drew closer to the norm on guilty
plea and acquittal rates possibly because of an increasing trial penalty.
Perhaps the best we can do for now is to ascribe the phenomenal
growth (one might even call it metastasizing) of drug cases to the
shifting priorities of federal prosecutors and lawmakers.
The various types of crimes that influenced the mix of outcomes
over the years are not limited to liquor and drug cases. In recent
years, immigration and weapons cases have become salient, and in
148
earlier eras, automobile theft cases had a significant presence.
In
each of these instances, the effect of the crime category was noteworthy but brief. Liquor cases dominated the federal scene, but only during the 1920s and early 1930s. Narcotics cases mattered not at all until
the 1970s, because there were so few of them until that time. Particu-

(showing that guilty plea rates in drug trafficking cases climbed steadily from 82% in
1992 to 94.2% in 1999).
146
According to statistics from the AOUSC, the cases of 80 of the 2,400 narcotics
defendants in 1950 ended in acquittals. Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. In
2002, 184 of 29,477 ended in acquittals. Id. Because successful motions to suppress
evidence in drug cases often effectively end the cases by producing dismissals, dismissals as opposed to acquittals might become especially significant dispositions in drug
cases.
147
Various features of drug cases that signal their seriousness (such as type of
drug, amount of drugs, or number of persons involved in the distribution) can only
explain a small portion of the changes in acquittal and guilty plea rates. See Bowman &
Heise, supra note 145, at 1088, 1128 (stating that recent changes in the types of cases
and defendants prosecuted correlate with prosecutor willingness to engage in plea
bargaining practices); Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An
Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level,
87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 547 (2002) (discussing how “low-seriousness” drug crimes often
receive extra sentence discounts beyond what the guidelines dictate).
148
See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 4. Immigration cases affected
guilty plea and acquittal rates whenever prosecutors filed them in large numbers, but
these cases appeared in high volume only during the 1940s, the early 1950s, and from
the mid-1990s to the present. Id.
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lar crimes always stay on the leading edge of changes in federal acquittals and guilty pleas, but the identity of such crimes changes often
across the years.
D. Sentence Severity and Trial Penalties in the 1990s
Sentencing law becomes relevant at the end of a criminal case, after conviction, but the effects of sentencing radiate back much earlier
in the case to influence both guilty plea decisions and acquittal outcomes. Changes in federal sentencing practices during the 1980s and
1990s increased the certainty and size of the penalty for going to trial,
and mightily influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during
those times.
Given this clear logical connection between sentencing laws and
guilty plea rates, it makes sense to concentrate on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the massive changes it wrought on federal
criminal sentencing. The statute abolished parole, instituted the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, and instructed the Commission to create
federal sentencing guidelines that would direct the sentencing deci149
sions of federal judges.
The sentencing guidelines that took effect nationwide in 1989, together with some important mandatory sentencing laws that Congress
passed between 1984 and 1989, dramatically shifted the sentencing
150
outcomes in federal court.
Sentences became far more severe: the
151
use of probation withered, and prison terms stretched out.
Given
this new severity, some predicted that the sentencing guidelines would
prompt a catastrophic increase in the trial rate, as defendants facing

149

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2., 98 Stat. 1837,
1984; see generally Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law
Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (noting that a
federal court must abide by the guidelines created by the Commission unless a departure is warranted).
150
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (affirming the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act); Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws:
Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 61
(1993) (“[D]eterminate sentencing schemes and mandatory enhanced sentences have
largely displaced discretionary sentencing regimes operating within broad sentencing
constraints.”).
151
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: CENTRAL QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED 19 tbl.1(1992) (showing that among the problems with
the guidelines identified by judges, attorneys, and probation officers are dehumanization, severity, and lack of discretion).
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such severe sentences would have little to lose by going to trial. 152
Those predictions turned out to be wrong, as guilty plea rates contin153
ued to climb after the guidelines took effect.
Predictions about the effect of the sentencing guidelines on guilty
plea rates initially focused on the wrong factor. The severity of sentences generally matters less in plea bargaining than the size of the dis154
count that a defendant receives for pleading guilty.
To the extent
the plea discount is large and certain, guilty pleas will follow; when the
155
plea discount is small and uncertain, more trials will occur.
One key accomplishment of the federal sentencing guidelines was
to make the plea discounts more certain. For example, defendants
typically had to plead guilty to receive the two-level or three-level sen152

See Terence Dunworth & Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal
Courts: The Guidelines Experience, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 99, 151 (1992) (ascribing increased
trial rates, especially for drug cases, to the implementation of the guidelines and the
concomitant mandatory minimums and changes in prosecutorial policies); Gerald W.
Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
161, 184 (1991) (“[T]he sentencing data from the selected districts demonstrate that
the guidelines have reduced the number of defendants pleading guilty even though
the guidelines have increased the incentive to plead guilty and enhanced the penalty
for going to trial.”); cf. Reinganum, supra note 59, at 65 (2000) (stating that the game
theory model suggests that the guidelines will increase average sentence length but not
the guilty plea rate).
153
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the
Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of
Incarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, 66-77(1991) (demonstrating “the lack of an effect associated with the guidelines on the number and proportion
of guilty pleas among filed cases.”). The two-year hiatus in guilty plea rate increase,
from 1989 to 1990, could be attributed to the uncertainty of the parties over how to
apply the new rules. Several Department of Justice policies issued between 1989 and
1992 attempted to control the use of plea bargains by line prosecutors, and these policies might help explain the depressed rates of guilty pleas in the 1989-1991 period. See
MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 41, at 1014-25 (discussing how even after the adoption
of the sentencing guidelines, prosecutors continued to engage in charge, fact, and sentence bargains, but were restricted by Attorney General policies). This theory seems
tenuous, as rates increased again in 1992, while those policies were still in effect.
154
See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2504-07 (discussing the effect of discounts on plea
bargaining); Leipold, supra note 71, at 158 (indicating the effect of probable trial outcome on bargaining strategy); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors
as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1258 (2004) (stating that guilty plea rates will continue to rise if prosecutors have the habit of offering deals the defendant “cannot refuse”).
155
See Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 291, 295 (1987) (hypothesizing that with increased uncertainty in obtaining a conviction comes a decrease in the chances of prosecution, which in turn decreases the number of guilty pleas); Anne M. Heinz & Wayne A. Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of a Reform in Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349,
363-64 (1979) (stating that 60% of defendants interviewed said that the prospect of a
more severe sentence after trial was an important factor in deciding to plead guilty).
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156

tence discount for “acceptance of responsibility;” about 94% of the
defendants who pled guilty received the discount while only 8% of the
defendants who went to trial were given credit at sentencing for ac157
cepting responsibility.
In a similar vein, prosecutors were highly
unlikely to recommend a “substantial assistance” departure for defen158
dants who insisted on a trial.
Other portions of the guilty plea discount were delivered through “guideline factor bargains” (in which
the parties agree to the applicability of certain adjustments up or
down in the guideline calculations) and “fact bargains” (in which the
parties stipulate to the presence of certain facts relevant to the sen159
tence).
These methods of guaranteeing a plea discount, especially when
combined with the increased certainty that the judge (now subject to
appellate review) would remain near the sentence range that the parties recommended, promoted more guilty pleas. It also appears likely
160
that the size of the discount bulked up during the guideline years.

156

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004) (setting forth the “Acceptance of Responsibility” guidelines); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section
3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1513 (1997) (arguing
that the commission sought to encourage guilty pleas without incurring the disadvantage of automatic sentence discounts, and found acceptance of responsibility discounts
to be a good solution); Andrew J. Hosmanek, Beyond Remorse: True Acceptance of
Responsibility and a Proposal for the Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 19-24 (Nov. 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=613687
(discussing what it means to “accept responsibility” and when this downward adjustment should be, and is most frequently, granted).
157
More specifically, according to Sentencing Commission data for fiscal year
2001, 6.1% of defendants pleading guilty or nolo contendere failed to receive a discount for acceptance of responsibility, while 92% of the defendants going to trial failed
to receive such a discount. Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
158
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000) (providing courts with limited authority to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another defendant); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) (describing factors the court may consider when
determining a substantial assistance departure). In fiscal year 2001, 17.7% of defendants who pled guilty also received a substantial assistance departure, while 1.7% of
defendants who went to trial received such a departure sentence. The specific figures
appear in the USSC SC01OUT database. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
159
See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1292-93 (1997) (discussing guideline factor bargains and fact
bargaining and their use in circumventing the guidelines).
160
The average prison sentence, in months, imposed in 2001 was 42.5 after a
guilty or nolo plea, and 138.5 after trial. These calculations are derived from the USSC
SC01OUT database. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
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The federal guidelines changed more than the size and certainty
of the trial penalty: they also changed who controls the penalty.
Whereas the judge and the prosecutor once competed for control
over the rewards for pleading guilty, the sentencing guidelines, operating in a high volume system, shifted more of this control away from
the judge and toward the prosecutor. Defense attorneys grumble that
prosecutors operating under the sentencing guidelines can make it
161
virtually impossible to resist a guilty plea offer.
Judges also observe
frequently that the sentencing guidelines increased the relative
strength of the prosecutors and upset the balance of power in the sys162
tem.
More interestingly, federal judges note that the price of going
to trial has become so high that it undermines confidence in the ac163
curacy of guilty pleas. Academics and journalists make the same ob164
servation in passing.

161

See Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal
Criminal Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 482-83 (2004) (explaining that some
federal defense attorneys have recharacterized the central focus of their jobs as counseling defendants on sentencing consequences, rather than resisting charge and risking loss of credit for cooperation); Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Reasonable Doubts:
How Unproven Allegations Can Lengthen Time in Prison, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at A1
(quoting a defense attorney as saying, “Probation officers go to town and kill defendants who go to trial . . . . If you go to trial and lose, you get the book thrown at you—
without having a jury consider all the facts of your case. It dissuades you from your
constitutional right to go to trial”).
162
See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY 6 (1997), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/gssurvey.pdf (reporting that over
86% of district judges and chief probation officers either somewhat or strongly agreed
with the statement, “The Sentencing Guidelines give too much discretion to prosecutors”); KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 195 n.12 (1998) (listing several articles, essays, and letters written by judges that criticize the guidelines).
163
See United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 288-89 (D. Mass. 2004) (ruling
that the sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional partly because of the prosecutor
power to penalize going to trial).
164
See Lowenthal, supra note 150, at 78 (stating that the threat of filing a charge
with a mandatory minimum sentence “pressure[s] defendants, who otherwise might
test the state’s evidence, into accepting guilty pleas”); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A.
Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 137, 137 (1995) (explaining that guidelines give prosecutors “greater
leverage to virtually compel plea bargaining, force cooperation, and in essence determine the length of sentences”); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2551-54 (2004) (discussing how the costs
of going to trial affect plea bargaining); Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Prosecutors
Can Stack the Deck, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1996, at A1 (describing several cases in which
the maximum sentence imposed by the federal sentencing guidelines influenced a defendant’s decision to plea bargain); Marc Miller & Ronald Wright, Prosecutor Rex,
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Recent developments in federal sentencing law accelerated the
trend toward concentrating the control over the trial penalty in the
hands of the prosecutor. In 2003, Congress amended the sentencing
statutes (in the so-called “Feeney Amendment”) to restrict the power
of judges to depart from the presumptive guideline sentence, except
165
in cases where the prosecutor recommends a discount.
The same
law gave prosecutors absolute control over one part of the sentence
166
discount for acceptance of responsibility.
In 2005, another profound change in federal sentencing shifted
the control back toward a more even balance between the prosecutor
and the judge. The Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Booker that
a sentencing judge cannot increase the presumptive guideline range
applicable to a defendant unless a jury finds the facts needed to au167
thorize the increased sentence.
Yet in a remarkable application of
severability doctrine, the Court also declared that the remedy for this
unconstitutional application of the guidelines in some cases was to
treat the guidelines as non-binding in all cases. Because the guidelines are now non-binding, the plea discounts that prosecutors offer to
defendants are less certain than before. The judge might or might
not follow the recommendation for a guideline sentence, leaving defendants less certain about whether a given judge will apply the sen168
tence discounts as expected.
The federal guidelines were not the only source of changes in sentencing law that affected the price defendants paid for going to trial.

PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 2003, at A39 (suggesting that large differences between sentences from trials and sentences from plea bargains can unduly sway defendants towards plea bargains).
165
See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (detailing when a judge may impose a sentence below the guideline standard). For commentary on the effects of the PROTECT Act, see Miller, supra note 154, at 1227, which
notes in particular how the PROTECT Act induced changes in the sentencing guidelines regime beyond the original congressional intent); also helpful is Stephanos Bibas,
The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 297-303 (2004), which predicts that the Feeney
Amendment will lead to decreased judicial discretion and increased prosecutorial
power).
166
PROTECT Act § 401, 117 Stat. at 671-72; see generally Margareth Etienne, Acceptance of Responsibility and Plea Bargaining Under the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G
REP. 109 (2003) (outlining increased options for plea bargaining in light of the new
legislation).
167
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
168
The precise contours of this uncertainty will depend on the type of appellate
review that develops under the “reasonableness” standard of review that the Booker
court created. For that standard, see id. at 765.
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The guidelines took effect in 1989, but the severity of federal sentences increased for many years before that, just as guilty plea in169
creases and acquittal decreases pre-dated the guidelines.
Over the
long haul, as the severity of the sentencing options that prosecutors
could utilize increased, larger plea discounts became possible.
While acknowledging the more long-term forces at work in the law
of federal sentencing, we must keep the guidelines at the center of the
story. Recall from Figure 2 that acquittals in federal court, while they
declined throughout the 1980s, began their steepest decline after
170
1989.
The greatest imbalances between acquittals and other outcomes (including guilty pleas, trial convictions, and dismissals) all appeared in the 1990s. In short, the federal sentencing guidelines were
a driving force in the disturbing disappearance of acquittals from the
system.
E. Prosecutor Power as the Leading Acquittal Culprit
As we have seen, several different features of federal criminal
practice could have altered guilty plea and acquittal rates over the
decades. But it is one thing to know the possible culprits, and another
thing to know which were the most important and how they interacted. Furthermore, our list of possible causes for guilty pleas and acquittals is only a partial one.
How might we estimate which of the many likely causes were most
important? One clue comes from longevity. The effects of particular
types of crimes (especially narcotics crimes) and procedural complexities (such as the presence of defense counsel and the expansion of
pretrial release) were concentrated in fairly small time periods. The
effect of prosecutor and judge caseloads, however, worked across
many decades. For that reason, caseloads were probably more important than crime type or procedural complexity.
Statistical techniques also allow us to see the relative strength of
several causes that contribute to a single effect. A standard statistical
169

Cf. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 12
(indicating an increase in prison sentences prior to 1989). For indications that guilty
pleas increased and acquittals decreased before 1989, see supra Figures 1 and 2 and the
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1.
170
One aspect of the federal sentencing guidelines changed the value of partial
acquittals: relevant conduct provisions made it more likely that even acquitted conduct would still increase the defendant’s sentence. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the
Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 33, 93-94 (2003) (describing the limited value of partial acquittals under the
sentencing guidelines).
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tool of social scientists known as multiple regression analysis tracks the
effects of several different factors on an outcome and estimates the
weight of each factor, while holding constant the influence of the
171
others.
Treating the yearly rates of guilty pleas and acquittals as the
two “effects” to be explained, multiple regression analyses for the period from 1945 to 2002 (set out in the Appendix) confirm that the
number of prosecutors was the strongest among the potential
172
causes.
The significant influences on the guilty plea rate in a given year
included the number of federal prosecutors, the number of district
court judges, and the percentage of immigration crimes prosecuted
that year. For acquittal rates, the significant variables included those
same three factors plus the combined civil and criminal caseload on
judges.
Among all the significant variables, prosecutor resources showed
the largest effects. A larger number of prosecutors tended to send acquittals down and guilty pleas up. Meanwhile, the number of judges
had just the opposite effects: a larger judiciary produced higher acquittal rates and lower guilty plea rates. Judges with larger combined
caseloads had lower acquittal rates.
Why would more prosecutors—presumably with more time to devote to the available cases—tend to produce more guilty pleas and
fewer acquittals (even after controlling for the number and complexity of criminal cases terminated in a given year)? This may be a sign
that when the Department of Justice hired new prosecutors, they
added to the quantity more than the quality of cases.
Another relationship among the possible causes of these outcomes deserves close attention as well: the positive and negative signs
for the judge variables point in the opposite direction from the signs
for the prosecutor variables. Every prosecutor positive finds a matching judicial negative, and vice versa. This polarity—additional judges
and prosecutors had opposite effects on both the acquittal rate and

171

For a more complete description of regression analysis, see MICHAEL O.
FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 323-29 (1990). The two regressions presented in the Appendix to this Article are weighted least squares regressions
because the number of cases terminated in each year varied, making the percentages
for some years more reliable than others.
172
There is some risk of multi-collinearity in the use of annual data. For that reason, the regression in the Appendix explores a minimal number of variables and its
results should be interpreted cautiously.
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guilty plea rate—speaks volumes about the accuracy hypothesis.
If
additional prosecutors were presenting stronger and more convincing
cases at trial, the addition of new judges to preside over these supposedly more reliable cases should not cause an increase in the acquittal
rate. Instead, the extra judges would make it possible to achieve more
trial convictions in these higher quality cases.
Granted, it is conceivable that extra judges made trials less accurate, perhaps by giving unwarranted consideration to defense motions
174
to exclude reliable but improperly obtained evidence.
But this explanation of the statistical polarity between prosecutors and judges
requires us to believe that judges acted against type for many decades.
The aspiration of the trial judge in an adversary system is to promote
justice through accurate factual findings.
Statistical analysis indicating judges and prosecutors working at
cross purposes, and prosecutors exerting the larger influence, does
not speak well for the overall accuracy of the system. In a world where
additional prosecutors and judges have opposite effects, it seems more
likely that new prosecutors add new (probably weaker) cases to the
system and keep the guilty plea rate high by increasing the size or certainty of the guilty plea discount.
The interaction of the limited number of factors explored so far
tells us that guilty plea rates move higher and acquittal rates move
lower when prosecutors have the time to push them there. The displaced acquittal is a marker of prosecutorial opportunity and power.
The factors discussed so far do not exhaust the possibilities. For
one thing, we have reviewed potential causes internal to the criminal
justice system (such as the legal rules and resources available to the
parties), but no factors external to the system. For instance, changing
crime rates or the type of crime politics at work in a particular era
175
might give prosecutors different attitudes about guilty pleas. Judges
under different social conditions might prove more or less willing to
reward defendants for pleading guilty.
Many social conditions could affect the pool of potential jurors,
making them less inclined to acquit. Public attitudes toward crime
173

Cf. FISHER, supra note 22, at 116-24 (arguing that caseload pressures on judges
made them more amenable to plea bargaining).
174
See PIZZI, supra note 53, at 69-72, 222-23 (1999) (contending that a defendant’s
ability to suppress essential evidence through procedure is symptomatic of a weak trial
system).
175
See generally TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS (2001) (describing the interaction
between policymaking and crime control); STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF
STREET CRIME (1990) (discussing how politics can affect the criminal process).
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changed over the years, and very well could have affected the pattern
of outcomes in federal court. Over the last few decades in particular,
176
there has been a hardening of public attitudes about crime.
Such a
shift of attitudes might have encouraged guilty pleas and made acquittals more difficult to achieve.
Some additional factors “internal” to criminal justice, such as the
role of defense counsel or particular types of sentence discounts, also
have received only passing attention so far. Surely, then, our brief
look at the federal criminal docket over the decades could benefit
from a closer look. Part IV takes a more detailed tour of the possible
causes for guilty plea and acquittal rates in the federal districts during
the remarkable recent period from 1994 to 2002.
IV. LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS HOSTILE TO INNOCENCE
The federal criminal system divides into ninety-four distinct districts, each sharing some common features. Every district implements
the same federal statutes defining crimes, adjudication procedures,
and sentences, and each follows the same policies set by “Main Justice”
177
in Washington, D.C., for the entire Department.
The U.S. Attorney’s Offices also operate under centralized budgetary constraints
from Congress, money that the legislature sometimes uses to encour178
age particular priorities for investigation and prosecution.
But each of the ninety-four federal districts also has much autonomy, and each produces its own distinctive brand of federal justice.
The United States Attorney for each district makes all the hiring deci-

176

See Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171, 175-76 (finding dramatic growth in public support for capital punishment from 1966 to 1976); Tom R.
Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, But Why? The Psychology of
Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237, 257 (1997) (stating
that public support of punishment has increased over the last forty to fifty years); cf.
Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 31,
41-57 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (exploring the sociological and
psychological functions that punishment serves).
177
A few federal districts must process a distinctive set of crimes because of the
presence of Indian reservations or large government installations such as military
bases. See Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1996) (providing instruction for the
sentencing of crimes, not otherwise punishable, that are committed within federal jurisdictions).
178
See generally Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation,
and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 793-99 (1999) (describing how Congress’s budgetary powers can influence criminal enforcement decision making). For
an example in the arena of weapons crimes, see Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and
the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 392-96 (2001).
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sions for local attorneys and support staff, and allocates resources to
respond to the priorities of the district. The prosecutors in each dis179
trict interact with a defense bar with a distinctive local character,
and they encounter trial judges with individual priorities and habits,
180
along with the life tenure to protect that individuality.
181
This setting creates the conditions for a natural experiment.
While holding constant the basic legal framework from district to district, the environment changes as prosecutorial policies and habits of
working groups shift from place to place. Tracking these environmental changes allows us to see which of them contribute to high
182
guilty plea and low acquittal rates.
This Part explores some key characteristics of the ninety-four federal districts between 1994 and 2002. Although the time frame is
much shorter than that in our previous inquiry, it covers most of the
era of the sentencing guidelines—an era that, as we have seen, produced levels of guilty pleas and acquittals extreme enough to sound a
183
clear warning. The inquiry now becomes narrower but deeper.
Patterns of outcomes in the districts reveal some of the particular
sentencing laws that have contributed most clearly to the drop in acquittals over the last decade. Departures from the sentencing guidelines based on a defendant’s “substantial assistance” made a measurable difference. The same was true of the three-level “super
acceptance of responsibility” discount. Where these methods—largely

179

Some attorneys are privately retained, some are in private practice appointed
by the court under the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA panel attorneys”), and others are
staff attorneys for the Federal Public Defender.
180
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior . . . .”).
181
Others have taken advantage of this natural experiment opportunity in exploring other questions relating to federal criminal justice. See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion, supra note 145, at 1126 (investigating factors that influence the length of federal drug sentences); Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 147, at 554-58
(investigating further the factors that influence the length of federal drug sentences);
Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 249-71 (2004) (exploring prosecutorial decisions to
refuse to pursue indictment).
182
Cf. J. Fred Springer, Burglary and Robbery Plea Bargaining in California: An Organizational Perspective, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 157, 182-84 (1983) (conducting a three-county study
that isolated environmental factors contributing to different guilty plea practices).
183
The shorter study period also makes it practical to consider a longer list of potential causes based on consistent data sources. Unless otherwise indicated, the district-level data in this Part are compiled from case-level data assembled by the AOUSC
or the U.S. Sentencing Commission (the AOUSC ADJOUT and USSC SCOUT databases). See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. Many of the variables studied
here are not available in consistent and convenient formats prior to fiscal year 1994.
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controlled by prosecutors—were used most commonly, they contributed to an environment in the district that convinced defendants to
plead guilty and to opt out of trials that might have ended in acquittals. More generally, the prosecutor’s willingness to decrease the offense level under the guidelines resulted in more guilty pleas and
fewer acquittals.
Identifying the effects of sentencing devices such as these points
the way to a more healthy sentencing law down the road. Sentencing
discounts resting solely in the hands of prosecutors, such as substantial assistance departures, create the greatest threat of trial distortion.
The size of the trial penalty can remain reasonably small and relatively
uncertain—as it should be—only if judges retain some authority to
disagree with prosecutors about proposed discounts. Rules that designate judges as legitimate counterweights to prosecutors create a
separation of powers for sentencing, a state of affairs that holds the
best hope for reliable and accurate criminal justice.
A. Environmental Audits
The two separate regression analyses constructed here use two different “dependent variables” (the phenomena that are caused by the
184
“independent variables”).
The percentage of guilty pleas and the
percentage of acquittals in a particular district for a given year occupy
the center of attention, because a key indicator of trial distortion hap185
pens when guilty plea rates rise while acquittal rates fall.
The independent variables (that is, the potential causes of
change) fall under several different headings. A first group of variables attempts to measure the workload that the key actors must carry.
They track the number of cases that each prosecutor and judge han-

184

Because the dependent variables for the two studies are expressed as percentages, I use a weighted least squares regression to account for the different volume of
cases in each district. The weighting variable, the number of defendants in each district for each fiscal year whose cases were terminated, is found in the Judicial Business
Annual Report of the AOUSC, at Table D-7. See AOUSC JUDICIAL BUS. ANN. REP. tbl.D7 (1994-1997); AOUSC JUDICIAL BUS. ANN. REP. tbl.D-7 (1998-2002) available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc.judbus.html.
185
I omitted the Middle District of Georgia for every year in the study because of
its extremely high number of acquittals, which is a product of the large number of traffic offenses prosecuted as federal misdemeanors in that district. In a unique arrangement, the federal courts process all traffic violations that occur on two large military
bases in the district. Leipold, supra note 71, at 192. Data was often unavailable for at
least one variable in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands; because the weighted least squares regression in Table 2 uses a crosswise delete
method, these districts are not included in the study.
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186

dled in each district for each year.
The average number of days devoted to each criminal trial also could affect the workload of the ac187
tors and the willingness of the parties to go to trial.
Perhaps the
busy prosecutor with a heavier caseload is less anxious to take a case to
trial (particularly if the average trial lasts many days) and thus will be
more cooperative in plea negotiations or will increase the discount for
188
pleading guilty.
Those steeper discounts could convince more defendants to plead guilty, including a number who otherwise might
have been acquitted.
A second group of variables estimates the influence of the leadership within each prosecutor’s office. One variable shows the years in
office of each U.S. Attorney, and another the political party of the
189
President who appointed each U.S. Attorney.
After the lead prosecutor in a district takes office and enacts new office practices, attorneys in the district should become more certain as to how various
types of cases will be handled, and the number of guilty pleas should
increase.
A third set of variables tracks various resources and characteristics
of the defendant. The average number of “criminal history points” of
186

The AOUSC calculates a “weighted” criminal caseload per judge for each district in each fiscal year, appearing in its Judicial Business Annual Report, Table X-1A.
See AOUSC JUDICIAL BUS. ANN. REP. 1994-2002, supra note 184, at tbl.X-1A. The
prosecutor workload is necessarily a more crude figure, obtained by dividing the number of defendants whose cases were terminated in the district by the number of AUSAs
working in the district that year.
187
Figures that form the basis for this average in each district for each fiscal year
appear in the Judicial Business Annual Report, Table T-2. See id. at tbl.T-2. For details
on the calculation of this figure, see the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app.3.
188
See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 147, at 552 (concluding that
prosecutor workload correlated with sentence reductions in drug cases). Richard Boylan and Cheryl Long explored drug cases from 1993 to 1996 and concluded that
prosecutors from the largest and smallest offices are the ones most likely to go to trial,
while average-size offices are more likely to produce guilty pleas. They postulate that
prosecutors in settings where monitoring is difficult will be more likely to go to trial to
develop their “human capital” in trial skills. See Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long,
Size, Monitoring, and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys 1 (July
10, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0089.pdf
(studying the effectiveness of monitoring and its effect on U.S. Attorney performance
by examining plea rates).
189
In calculating the tenure of U.S. Attorneys, the year of appointment was designated as a 0, and one point added for each additional year in office. U.S. Attorneys
appointed by Republican Presidents were coded as 1, and those by Democratic Presidents as 0. Information about the appointment of U.S. Attorneys was located on
http://thomas.loc.gov. See Richard T. Boylan, Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the
Federal Criminal Justice System, 47 J.L. & ECON. 75, 87 (2004) (demonstrating the use of
U.S. Attorney tenure as an independent variable and showing that longer tenure increased the guilty plea rate).
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defendants sentenced in a district might indicate the amount of experience those defendants have with the criminal justice system, and
could affect the willingness of the judge and prosecutor to discount a
190
sentence.
Federal prosecutors have relatively little control over the
191
criminal history points that figure into a defendant’s sentence. As a
result, this variable presents a test of the accuracy hypothesis: a district with more serious, high-priority repeat criminals to prosecute
ought to produce fewer acquittals. Increasingly accurate prosecutors
would emphasize quality over quantity, and their district would contribute more than its share to a declining acquittal rate.
Because defendants who are detained until the date of trial are
192
considered more likely to plead guilty, another variable notes the
193
percentage of defendants in a district who are released before trial.
The percentage of defendants in a district who are Hispanic, black, or
194
female also go into the model.
Another defendant resource to consider is the type of counsel
195
working on the case.
An unusual number of defendants in the federal system retain private counsel, and in many settings it might be

190

The average criminal history points for defendants sentenced in each district
for each fiscal year came from databases of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, using the
TOTCHPTS variable. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
191
The prosecutor might make some adjustments at the margins, but prior record
has more or less the same effect regardless of any negotiated agreements. There are
some limited exceptions to this observation: for example, prosecutors do have more
practical control on the use of “armed career criminal” and “career criminal” enhancements. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1, .4 (2004) (outlining
sentencing ranges under these enhancements). These enhancements apply in relatively few cases. As we will see, the usage of career criminal enhancements in a district
had no significant effect on guilty pleas or acquittals. See Table 3. The percent of career criminal enhancements applied in each district during each fiscal year was calculated based on the Sentencing Commission database, CAROFFAP variable. See Bureau
of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
192
See Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 132, at 1031; supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
193
See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2491-93 (discussing the impact of bail and pretrial
detention on guilty pleas); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (2000); Salerno, supra note 134;
supra, notes 131, 134 and accompanying text.
194
Other scholars have noted a racial differential in the decision to plead guilty.
See Celesta A. Albonetti, Race and the Probability of Pleading Guilty, 6 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 315, 332 (1990) (finding that black defendants are, in some circumstances, less likely to plead guilty).
195
The percentage of cases in each district defended by Criminal Justice Act panel
attorneys, Federal Public Defender attorneys, or private attorneys (along with the percentage of cases involving waiver of attorney) can be found in the AOUSC ADJOUT
database, using the FLCOUNSL variable. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
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reasonable to expect stronger results from private attorneys.
However, the appointed attorneys in the federal system are exceptionally
well-trained and well-funded, so it is just as plausible that the type of
counsel used in a federal district does not affect that district’s guilty
plea or acquittal rates.
The next group of variables explores the types of crimes charged
in each district. These include the percentage of drug crimes, violent
crimes, theft and fraud crimes, weapon crimes, and immigration
197
crimes terminated annually in each district.
As an overall estimate
of the seriousness of the crimes charged, one variable calculates the
average “offense level” under the federal sentencing guidelines for de198
fendants sentenced in the district.
In contrast to the variable for criminal history points, the offense
level tells us more about the prosecutor’s discretionary choices than
about the raw material that the docket presents in a district. When it
comes to the offense level to be assigned, the federal prosecutor has
199
enormous discretion. If the average offense level in a district affects

196

Privately retained attorneys are generally believed to be more likely to go to
trial and to obtain acquittals. See COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY, supra note 125, at 29
(citing statistics from various districts showing that “pleas of guilty are entered much
more frequently by defendants with assigned counsel than those represented by private
counsel”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 35 & nn.123-24 (1997) (pointing to studies that show
that defendants with appointed counsel are more successful).
197
The types of crimes terminated in each district for each fiscal year are available
in the AOUSC ADJOUT database, using the TIGRON variable, which classifies all
crimes according to a six-variable classification system of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission, in its 1995 Annual Report, hypothesized that
guilty pleas were increasing because of an increase in immigration and fraud cases. See
1995 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 51, available at http://
www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1995/ch5_95.pdf (identifying lower trial rates for these types
of cases as contributing to the overall reduction in total trial rates and subsequent increase in the national plea rate). But George Fisher points out that the increased plea
rates in drug cases over time is a better explanation. FISHER, supra note 22, at 344
n.77. Sara Beale has noted that guilty pleas for gun cases are increasing in number as
the severity of sentences imposed for those crimes increases. See Sara Sun Beale, The
Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause
and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1677 (showing prosecutors’ inclination to use enhanced penalties as a “bargaining chip”).
198
The average offense level for each district in each fiscal year was calculated
based on the database from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, using the XFOLSOR
variable. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
199
Cf. David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, and Do Not Like What
They See, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 339 (1996) (reporting that about 40% of probation
officers believe that guideline calculations set forth in plea agreements in a majority of
cases are not supported by offense facts).
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the guilty plea or acquittal rates, that should reflect both the raw materials available to the prosecutors (giving us some reason to credit the
accuracy hypothesis) and the negotiating power of prosecutors (giving
us reason to believe the trial distortion theory).
More clear-cut tests for the trial distortion theory come from variables that more directly measure the perceived guilty plea discount
that defendants encounter as they decide whether to proceed with
200
trial.
These address some of the most well-known methods that
prosecutors have to reward cooperative defendants, including sentencing departures for those who provide “substantial assistance” to
201
the government, and the enhanced three-point discount for defen202
dants who fully accept responsibility for their crimes.
The rate of
judicial downward departures from the sentencing guidelines could
203
also reveal efforts to reward defendants for pleading guilty.
Two other blunt measures of the trial penalty try to capture the
differential between the sentence after trial and the sentence after a
guilty plea: one variable looks to the additional proportion of prison

200

Another potential measure of the prosecutor’s power to create a guilty plea
discount is the percentage of charges filed under statutes carrying mandatory minimum sentences, under such statutes as 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (B) (2000)
(narcotics amounts); 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2000) (telephone count); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(2000) (use of firearm). However, because the discounting effect of mandatory minimum charges can be achieved either by filing the charges and dismissing them later,
or by threatening to file the charges, this model does not track mandatory minimum
charges filed.
201
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004). The percentage of
cases in each district receiving the substantial assistance departure is available in the
Annual Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (for 1996-2002), available at www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm, tbl.30, and in the Annual
Report of the Commission (for 1995), available at www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm.
202
During the period 1994-2002, judges retained final authority over the rewarding of the three-point AR discount, but they relied heavily on prosecutors to determine
whether the plea of guilty arrived early enough to save the necessary resources. The
percentage of cases in each district for each fiscal year receiving a three-point discount
for AR is calculated based on the USSC SCOUT database, using the ACCTRESP variable. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
203
The percentage of cases receiving a judicial downward departure in each district is available from the Annual Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics and the
Annual Report of the Sentencing Commission. Other studies have treated departure
sentences as dependent variables. See Jeffrey T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 383, 385-86, 402-04 (1996) (exploring downward departures in
three Pennsylvania counties and finding that formal rational factors interact with extralegal criteria deemed relevant by local court actors, and that legally-sanctioned sentencing criteria are intertwined with defendants’ race and gender and exercise of trial
rights).

144

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 79

sentences imposed when defendants go to trial, while the other meas204
ures the longer duration of prison sentences imposed after trial.
Finally, several variables estimate the influence of different circuit
courts on the guilty plea and acquittal rates, after controlling for the
205
other case characteristics described above.
Differences among the
circuits might reflect distinctive legal rules imposed by the appellate
courts, or they could capture regional differences in courtroom practices and cultural differences in regions of the country that could
translate into different acquittal or guilty plea rates.
The results of the two regression analyses—one for guilty plea
rates and one for acquittal rates—appear in Table 3.

204

The differential for each district between the sentencing result after trial and
after a guilty plea is calculated based on the AOUSC ADJOUT database. The figures
are available through a cross-tabulation of the DISPOSIT variable and the TOTPRISN
variable (for duration) or the SENTENCE variable (for prison percentage). See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.
Because the cases going to trial may not be randomly selected, it is possible that
any difference in the sentences attached to the cases in the guilty plea and trial pools is
not actually a discount for pleading guilty. It may instead show that one or the other
of the pools involves more serious crimes. See FISHER, supra note 23, at 345 n.85 (investigating severity of the crime as a sentencing differential); Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota,
2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 287-337 (1993) (analyzing the duration of the sentence as a function of offense severity); Terence D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities Under Determinate Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguideline and
Postguideline Practices in Minnesota, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 337, 337-63 (1985) (showing that
even under determinate sentencing schemes, there will be differences in sentence duration that can be attributed to the severity of the offense). Note that offense level,
prior criminal record, and several other case features are controlled in this study.
205
The circuits were coded as categorical variables, and the regressions presented
in Table 2 used the Fifth Circuit as the reference category. Because the circuits are
categorical variables, the standardized coefficients for the circuits only allow comparisons between the size of impact relative to other circuits; no comparisons with other
factors are possible.

2005]

145

TRIAL DISTORTION AND THE END OF INNOCENCE

Table 3: Weighted Regression of Annual District-Level Guilty Plea
and Acquittal Rates, on Factors Related to Case Processing
and Prosecutorial Discretion, Federal
Criminal Cases, 1994-2002
Guilty Plea %

Acquittal %

Coefficient

Standardized

t

8.735E-05

0.031

-4.25E-05

-0.165

-4.75E-03

Coefficient

Standardized

t

0.980 -5.16E-06

-0.008

-0.186

**

-3.300

3.203E-06

0.051

0.800

-0.139

**

-4.030

1.540E-04

0.019

0.421

3.601E-04

0.020

0.829 -1.44E-04

-0.032

-1.070

3.974E-03

0.038

1.469 -1.31E-03

-0.052

-1.564

4.466E-02

0.201

**

3.710 -1.295E-02

-0.238

*

2.482 -4.84E-03

-0.126

Caseload Factors:
Prosecutor
Criminal Caseload
Judge
Criminal Caseload
Average Trial Days

Prosecutor Office Leadership Factors:
U.S. Attorney
Tenure
U.S. Attorney
Political Party
Defendant Factors:
Black %
Hispanic %

3.726E-02

0.206

-3.440
-1.182

Female %

5.035E-02

0.046

1.339

Pretrial Release %

5.930E-03

0.023

0.692 -5.75E-03

Counsel Private %

-5.85E-03

-0.019

-0.454

0.094

1.786

Counsel FPD %

1.708E-02

0.073

1.626 -2.76E-03

-0.049

-0.847

Counsel CJA %

-6.32E-03

-0.022

-0.556

Criminal History

5.186E-03

0.125

7.542E-02

0.033

-9.96E-03

-0.521

Drug Crime %

-2.49E-02

-0.070

Violent Crime %

**

2.613E-03

**

7.147E-03

0.010
-0.091

*

0.224
-2.162

-1.10E-03

-0.016

3.331 -1.14E-03

-0.114

-0.311
-2.361

0.922 -3.38E-02

-0.064

-1.407

-11.583 7.138E-04

0.154

-1.473

0.082

*

Points, Average
Career Criminal
Enhancement %
Crime Type Factors:
Offense Level,

**

**

2.673

Average
7.076E-03

1.346

-3.83E-02

-0.033

-1.087

1.524E-02

0.054

1.394

Theft-Fraud Crime % -5.89E-02

-0.145

**

-3.253

8.137E-03

0.083

1.446

Weapon Crime %

-0.129

**

-3.870

1.237E-02

0.050

1.177

-0.612

-1.08E-02

-0.144

-1.454

-0.131

Immigration Crime % -1.47E-02

-0.048
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Table 3 (cont’d)
Guilty Plea %

Acquittal %

Coefficient Standardized t

Coefficient Standardized

t

Plea Discount Factors:
0.117

**

5.591

-2.18E-02

-0.196

0.260

0.663

**

15.952

-3.99E-02

-0.418

3.097E-03

0.010

0.233

-1.48E-03

-0.020

5.471E-02

0.111

**

3.562

-2.86E-02

-0.239

-5.992

5.554E-05

0.052

*

2.226

-7.48E-06

-0.029

-0.965

9.453E-03

0.027

0.995

7.022E-03

0.084

3.592

-1.20E-03

-0.030

0.015

2.056E-03

0.041

-2.165

5.517E-03

0.171

Substantial Assistance 8.117E-02

**

-4.840

**

-7.870

Departure %
Acceptance of
Responsibility %
Judicial Downward

-0.360

Departure %
Prison %,

**

Trial Differential
Prison Duration,
Trial Differential
Regional Factors:
1st Circuit

**

*

2d Circuit

2.089E-02

0.125

3d Circuit

2.942E-05

0.000

4th Circuit

-1.16E-02

-0.087

6th Circuit

-1.15E-04

-0.001

-0.022

5.882E-03

0.149

7th Circuit

-1.84E-03

-0.008

-0.310

-3.38E-03

-0.063

*

2.381
-0.666

**

**

1.070
3.316
3.616
-1.829

8th Circuit

2.994E-03

0.016

0.520

2.799E-03

0.062

1.567

9th Circuit

1.831E-02

0.173

**

3.256

-3.25E-03

-0.130

-1.862

10th Circuit

1.269E-02

0.071

*

2.372

-3.48E-04

-0.080

-0.210

11th Circuit

-1.96E-02

Constant

0.943

Adjusted R Square

0.663

-0.140

*

-4.360

8.093E-03

51.606

3.460E-02

0.238

**

5.810
6.096

0.449

N = 704, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
B. Trials and Tribulations by the Numbers
For readers unfamiliar with regression analysis, a brief guide is in
order. The key entries in Table 3 appear in bold under the “Standardized” column for each of the two studies (one for guilty pleas and
one for acquittals). The standardized coefficient allows a reader to
compare the relative size of the impact that various factors have on
206
the dependent variable. A larger standardized coefficient (either in
a positive or negative direction) indicates a stronger effect of that

206

See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 171, at 324 (explaining how to interpret
coefficients).

2005]

TRIAL DISTORTION AND THE END OF INNOCENCE

147

variable on guilty pleas or acquittals in the districts. The positive or
negative sign of each standardized coefficient is also worth noting: a
negative sign means that when the independent variable in that row
increases, guilty plea rates decrease (or acquittal rates decrease for the
right-hand column of standardized coefficients). A positive sign
means that when the factor in question increases, guilty plea or acquittal rates also increase. The variables worthy of attention appear in
bold typeface; they produced effects clear enough to leave us confident that the patterns were not merely a product of chance.
The variables that deserve attention first are those that demonstrate a statistically significant impact on both guilty plea and acquittal
rates. Two such variables offer some of the most clear-cut signs of
prosecutor influence. The first is the enhanced three-point “acceptance of responsibility” sentence discount (or “super AR” for short).
The connection between guilty pleas and an ordinary two-point AR
discount is not surprising, as virtually all defendants who plead guilty
207
receive the discount and virtually none who lose at trial receive it.
But federal prosecutors powerfully influence the super AR discount;
until recently, the guideline language required the defendant to provide “timely” and “complete” information to the government “con208
cerning his own involvement in the offense.” This timely notice had
to be early enough to permit the government to avoid trial preparation. For all these preconditions to the award of the extra discount,
209
the court relied on factual representations from the government.
As Table 3 shows, in districts where the prosecutors more frequently
request this discount, guilty plea rates tend to be higher. Even more
revealing is the conclusion that acquittal rates tend to be lower in districts where super AR is used heavily.
“Substantial assistance” departures also affect both the guilty plea
and acquittal rates. The positive effect on guilty plea rates confirms
other scholars’ work showing how prosecutors use these departures to
210
encourage guilty pleas.
Even more dispiriting is the effect of sub207

See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E.1(b)(1) (2002) (allowing an
additional level of sentence discount).
209
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (2004) (requiring motion
from the government). This guideline was amended to allow the third discount level
in 1992. In 2003, Congress directly amended this provision to place control of the discount completely in the hands of the prosecution.
210
See Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt
on “Substantial Assistance” Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 13-16 (1999) (showing that defendants are more willing to cooperate
with the government when the government files more substantial assistance motions).
208
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stantial assistance departures on acquittal rates: districts with high
levels of such departures also tended to show lower rates of acquittals.
Prosecutors are not using their substantial assistance departures only
to avoid the easy trials where a conviction was nearly inevitable.
The contrast between the effects of prosecutor versus judicial departures is instructive. The rate of judicial downward departures in a
district had no significant effect on either guilty plea or acquittal rates
in the district. These departure variables, when combined, give us
some reason to believe that prosecutor choices matter more than judicial choices in setting the price of trials.
Another variable offers an unobstructed view of trial distortion at
work: the differential between the percentage of prison sentences
imposed after trial and after a guilty plea. According to Table 3, districts with a larger differential in the percentage of prison sentences
imposed (that is, districts with a larger average plea discount) were
likely to have lower acquittal rates and higher guilty plea rates. Even
after controlling for type of crime, offense level, and other features of
a district’s caseload, the prospects of receiving a prison sentence after
trial remained an important influence on the decision by defendants
211
to give up their defenses.
For the last decade in the federal system,
inducements like these were effective in the weakest cases where juries
might otherwise have acquitted.
A pair of variables, when considered together, sheds further light
on prosecutor influence: the average offense level for crimes in the
district, and the average criminal history points assigned to convicted
defendants in the district. These outcomes deserve special attention
because they run in opposite directions, both for guilty pleas and acquittals. Higher offense levels generate lower guilty plea rates, while
higher criminal history scores lead to higher guilty plea rates. Conversely, higher offense levels send acquittal rates up, but higher criminal history scores drive acquittal rates down.
This pattern is meaningful because prosecutors have more control
over offense levels than offender criminal history. Through the relevant conduct rules, prosecutors choose whether or not to marshal the
evidence for factual findings that increase the range permitted by the
guidelines. The offender’s criminal history, which the court is more
likely to figure into a defendant’s sentence regardless of the prosecutor’s choices in constructing the case, has effects more consistent with

211

A related measure of sentence severity, the difference between the length of
prison terms imposed after guilty pleas and the length of terms imposed after trial,
significantly influenced guilty pleas but not acquittals.
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the accuracy hypothesis. Districts that process defendants who present more serious criminal histories also produce lower acquittal rates,
suggesting that judges and prosecutors in these districts value quality
over quantity and put extra effort into avoiding acquittals for these
212
high-priority defendants.
Just the opposite, however, holds true for offense levels. The districts with the highest average offense levels also had the lowest guilty
plea rates and highest acquittal rates. If prosecutors in these districts
simply faced more objectively serious criminal conduct, an increasingly accurate system would require prosecutors to prioritize resources
to these cases and drive the acquittal rates down. Lower offense levels
produce higher guilty plea rates, suggesting that prosecutors in these
districts work with defendants to reduce the offense level calculations
under the guidelines to induce a guilty plea.
The criminal caseloads of prosecutors and judges mattered less
over the last decade than they did over the longer period considered
in Part III. After controlling for other features of the cases on a district’s docket, the prosecutors’ caseloads in a district did not affect either the guilty plea or acquittal rate. Heavier judicial criminal
caseloads and longer trials (a proxy for the complexity of cases) both
had a negative effect on guilty plea rates, but no significant effect on
acquittal rates. These variables might identify districts where local attitudes are more favorable to trials (thus producing higher weighted
judicial workloads and lower guilty plea rates simultaneously). There
is not much evidence here to suggest that judges are influencing
guilty plea rates, be it out of concern for docket control or for other
213
reasons.
Two variables relating to defendant demographics also tip the
scales towards a trial distortion theory. Black defendants were less
likely than white defendants to be acquitted and more likely to plead
guilty, holding other caseload features constant. Districts with more
Hispanic defendants also had higher levels of guilty pleas. Given the
limited number of defendant characteristics captured in this model,
the defendant’s race or ethnicity might reflect differences of income,

212

See supra Part II.C.3 for an explanation of the relationship between quality and
quantity in criminal case processing.
213
As Table 3 shows, more pretrial releases in a district lead to fewer acquittals
(even though the defendant is available to assist with the defense). One might interpret this finding as good news: federal prosecutors, to their credit, are not taking any
tactical advantages that might arise from a defendant being detained before trial.
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214

education, or other personal characteristics.
Still, the race and ethnicity variables do suggest that offender demographics influence plea
negotiations and outcomes, which is consistent with studies that have
focused more closely on how these factors distort the operation of
215
more legally relevant factors.
Statistics about the litigation resources and outcomes for each of
the federal districts give us only a partial view of the rich reality of federal courthouses; this view, however, is from a new vantage point that
allows a view of things not easily visible from ground level. The statistics on court resources and outcomes tell us that dropping acquittal
rates over the last decade in federal court is a valid cause of concern.
The acquittal trend reveals a system that probably distorts trial outcomes and produces less reliable results than it once did. The devices
available to offer defendants a large and certain sentence discount for
waiving trial—particularly those devices largely in the control of
prosecutors—have come to dominate the practice of criminal law in
the federal courts.
C. The Sentencing Law Nexus
What guidance can this survey offer about the reforms needed to
prevent the distortions from expected outcomes at trial? Most conversations about plea bargains eventually return to sentencing laws and
practices, and this one is no exception. Most of the devices that drive
down acquittal rates are grounded in sentencing laws; hence, the best
strategy for improving the reliability and public legitimacy of plea
bargains should focus on the nexus between plea bargains and sentencing.
These are times for taking stock in federal sentencing. The Su216
preme Court, in Blakely v. Washington, overturned a state sentencing
system that allowed a judge rather than a jury to find facts necessary to
increase the authorized sentence. In Booker v. United States, the Supreme Court applied this holding to the federal sentencing guidelines
and restructured the statutes to require district court judges to use the
guidelines on an “advisory” basis, leaving the judges free to impose a
sentence outside the guidelines if such an outcome would better serve

214

It would be especially important to study case-level data before drawing strong
inferences from a finding about race and acquittals, and this study relies on districtlevel data.
215
See, e.g., Albonetti, supra note 194 (analyzing the relationship between race and
guilty plea rates).
216
124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004).
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217

the statutory purposes of sentencing.
The sentence that a trial
judge imposes is still subject to appellate review, and can be over218
turned if the sentence is “unreasonable.”
This is not the place for an analysis of Blakely or Booker as a matter
219
of constitutional law or of sound sentencing policy.
The importance of these cases for our purposes is the upheaval they caused.
Congress is now considering fundamental changes in the federal sentencing laws---changes that the Supreme Court forced to the top of the
220
legislative agenda.
Attention to guilty pleas should now inform any
wholesale revisions to federal sentencing law that occur during this
unexpected effort of redesigning the system.
The main threats to healthy federal guilty plea practices are sentencing and charging practices that increase the size and certainty of
the trial penalty. To the extent that a guilty plea becomes a prerequisite to receiving a particular form of sentence discount, that discount
undercuts the power of the trial to uncover the truth. Furthermore,
the best way to judge the tendency of a sentencing discount to influence the trial penalty is to check who controls the discount. The historical and statistical analyses in Parts III and IV support the commonsense inference that federal prosecutors in our current system affect
the trial penalty more than judges do. Therefore, the most important
target in reforming sentencing law should be rules that currently give
prosecutors monopoly power to link sentence discounts to the defendant’s choice to plead guilty.
Two examples of such rules are the enhanced discount for acceptance of responsibility and downward departures based on a defendant’s substantial assistance to the government in other investigations.

217

125 S. Ct. 738, 768 (2005) (loosening the binding power of the sentencing
guidelines).
218
Id. at 766 (“Those factors [listed in the sentencing guidelines] in turn will
guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is
unreasonable.”).
219
See generally Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure:
The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming
Nov.
2005),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=763804 (discussing Blakely and Booker as examples of a distinctive style of constitutional reasoning); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely,
16 FED. SENT’G REP. 316 (June 2004) (discussing Blakely’s impact on the sentencing
guidelines); Steven Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377
(2005) (discussing criminal sentencing in light of Blakely).
220
See Posting of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, A Bit of Booker
Fix
Buzz,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/10/
a_bit_of_booker.html (Oct. 2, 2005, 4:29 PM) (discussing an imminent congressional
response to Booker).
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For the latter discounts, the law grants the prosecutor sole power to
221
award the discount, while in the case of acceptance of responsibility
222
discounts, the prosecutor has always been powerfully persuasive. Although the prosecutor’s basis for awarding these discounts is often
opaque, it is clear to most defendants that a guilty plea is a necessary
condition. Restoring some judicial control over these sentence discounts could weaken their link to guilty pleas, making them more
available to defendants with the temerity to exercise constitutional
trial rights.
The remedy cobbled together by five Justices in Booker, while odd
as a matter of severability doctrine, might be successful in policy
terms. It could shift federal plea practices away from the worst dangers of trial distortion. The basic thrust of the “advisory guidelines”
system is to reassert the authority of the sentencing judge and to make
less certain the prosecutor’s control over the means of delivering a
trial penalty. Districts will not move uniformly, but on the whole they
could move in the direction of a more balanced exercise of sentencing power.
The advisory guidelines envisioned in Booker will probably not,
however, create a stable platform for federal sentencing. Congress is
likely to restructure the system, and the options are plentiful: “guidelines without lids,” a streamlined set of aggravating facts, or a collec-

221

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) (permitting courts to
depart from guidelines upon motion by the government due to defendant’s assistance
in other matters); United States v. Wade, 504 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (explaining that a
defendant’s assistance does not guarantee such a departure from the guidelines, but
that any departure is within the prosecutor’s discretion).
222
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (2004) (permitting prosecutors to further decrease a sentence due to assistance when the defendant has clearly
demonstrated acceptance of responsibility). The 2003 Feeney Amendment solidified
prosecutor control over the three-point acceptance of responsibility discounts, already
a crucial cause of displaced acquittals. See Michael M. O’Hear, Cooperation and Accountability After the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 102 (Dec. 2003) (arguing for expanded Justice Department control over the acceptance of responsibility discount).
For instance, the 2003 law also empowered prosecutors to designate certain “fast-track”
districts for the use of special sentence discounts that would increase the volume of
guilty pleas. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today (PROTECT) Act § 401(d)(2) (2003) (establishing a de novo appellate
standard of review for downward but not for upward departures); id. § 401(m)(2)(A)
(instructing the Sentencing Commission to place further limits on downward departures); id. § 401(l)(2)(A) (mandating that downward departures and name of sentencing judge be reported to House and Senate Judiciary Committees).
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tion of mandatory minimum penalties superimposed on the advisory
223
guidelines.
In this Article, I have not addressed the impact of mandatory
224
minimum penalties on guilty plea practices, but these laws invoke
familiar themes regarding prosecutorial monopoly power over sentence discounts. Mandatory minimum sentence laws exert a powerful
pull on plea negotiations, because a prosecutor’s promise not to file
(or to dismiss) charges that carry a mandatory minimum penalty can
create enormous gaps in the sentence imposed and enormous incen225
tives to plead guilty.
Mandatory minimum sentences might become
the rule rather than the exception in the federal system as Congress
reconstructs the sentencing system in the aftermath of Blakely and
226
Booker, but legislators who care about accuracy in criminal justice
should look to alternatives.
Healthy revisions to the sentencing laws should give judges the authority to second-guess the prosecutor’s desire to discount sentences
and induce a guilty plea. Yet there is a danger in such proposals, in
that they put upward pressure on federal sentences. The strategy of
increasing the authority of judges to counterbalance prosecutors
means that judges will reject more sentence discounts. In a federal
system that many (myself included) consider to be too severe already,
this might be too high a price to pay for a more accurate system that
values innocence.
At the end of the day, it may become necessary to address severe
sentences directly. Legislatures often create high maximum sentences
223

See Postings of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, Topical Archive: Legislative Reactions to Booker and Blakely, http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/legislative_reactions_to_booker_and_blakely (relating and
evaluating possible legislative changes to the sentencing system).
224
See supra note 200 for a discussion of why the study in Part IV does not include
mandatory minimum charging as an independent variable.
225
See JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDA26-27
(2004),
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/
TIONS
JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf; Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just
Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 97 (2003) (“[P]rosecutors exercise significant control of sentence length through charging decisions and use sentencing phase
mitigation to give the appearance of mitigation to induce pleas.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 202 (1993)
(“Mandatories then become little more than a bargaining chip, a ‘hammer’ which the
prosecutor can invoke at her option, to obtain more guilty pleas under more favorable
terms.”).
226
See Keith Perine, ‘Heightened Tensions’ Fray Judicial-Legislative Relations, CQ
WEEKLY, Sept. 18, 2004, at 2148 (addressing congressional concerns about using mandatory minimums in response to “activist judges”).
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with the express intention of giving prosecutors a “bargaining chip” to
227
produce more guilty pleas.
An overall reduction in the severity of
authorized federal punishments would squeeze down the plea discount that the prosecutor could offer. That would translate into guilty
pleas that do not target the weak cases destined for dismissal or acquittal. Less room for discounting sentences during plea negotiations
leaves more room for truth to prosper.
CONCLUSION
Although the lessons for federal criminal justice are profound, the
power of plea bargaining practices to displace acquittals and distort
the truth-finding function of trials is not strictly a federal problem.
The same can and does happen in state criminal justice, where the
228
great bulk of criminal matters in the United States are processed.
The voting public in each state invests large amounts of public funds
in criminal justice systems, and expects those systems to uncover the
truth.
There are reasons to think the problems of trial distortion are at
least as important at the state level as in the federal courts. Lower
olume courts dealing with the most serious crimes are said to be the
places where trials still matter. The federal courts—which process far
more felonies than misdemeanors—are thought to epitomize this sort
of system. The caseload for the federal prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges is less crushing than the caseload for their state counterparts. While plea bargaining is recognized as the most important
method for disposing of cases even in the federal system, the federal
criminal trial is still thought to cast a long shadow.
On the other hand, in higher volume courts at the lowest levels of
the state court systems, trials almost never happen. Those cases almost always result in guilty pleas. In addition, there is only limited
conversation between attorneys about how to resolve the case, because
the “going rate” for each crime, committed by a defendant with a par229
ticular criminal record, is well established.
Given the huge volume
227

See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutors’ bargaining

chips).
228

See Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351,
1362-63 (2005) (articulating the need to gather state-level data that distinguishes between guilty pleas and convictions or acquittals).
229
See Malcolm M. Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower Courts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461,
463 (1979) (“[A] case whose outcome has been the result of vigorous bargaining or
trial can establish a new ‘going rate’ for subsequent similar cases.”).
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of cases involved and the limited scrutiny each receives, there is little
reason to hope that the outcomes of plea negotiations come close to
replicating the outcomes that a trial would produce. The federal system, for all its problems, is probably not alone in punishing trials so
severely that the results do not deserve public confidence.
The relationship between acquittal rates and guilty plea rates is
especially relevant for those who still hope to blunt the power of the
plea bargain and to give force instead to the public’s negative views on
bargain justice. Some forms of bargain justice are more harmful than
others, and the critical task is to find economical ways of targeting and
disposing of the greatest harms.
In the absence of sorting techniques such as the one developed
here, we can only speak in bromides about the coercion inherent in
plea negotiations, but we cannot easily differentiate among concrete
plea practices in specific times and places. When no shorthand
method of evaluation is available, we are left waiting for exhaustive
case-by-case studies based on the knowledge of local insiders, and we
230
must suspend moral judgment in the meantime.
Accessible but
non-definitive measures, such as the warning signals from the drop in
acquittals, cure this paralysis. Such a warning gives voice to those willing to speak against possible injustice, even if the definitive proof of
injustice in specific cases never arrives.

230

See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 159, at 1297, for one of the few examples of
detailed evaluations of plea bargaining practices, based on rare levels of cooperation
from ten U.S. Attorney’s Offices.
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APPENDIX
Table A-1: Regression of Annual Guilty Plea and Acquittal Rates
on Factors Related to Caseload and Crime Types in
Federal Criminal Cases, 1945-2002

Number of AUSAs
Number of
District Judges
Criminal Case
Volume
Civil and Criminal
Cases per Judge
Average Days
per Trial
Narcotics Case %
Immigration Case %
Fraud-Theft Case %
Constant
Adjusted R Square

Guilty Plea %
Coefficient Standardized t

Acquittal %
Coefficient Standardized t

5.411E-05
-3.30E-04

2.001**
-1.163**

7.176
-3.032

-1.22E-05
7.818E-05

-1.855**
1.131**

-7.001
3.100

1.845E-07

0.056

0.259

2.525E-07

0.313

1.531

-8.51E-06

-0.017

-0.190

-3.52E-05

-0.285**

-3.399

2.38E-02

0.339

1.327

-4.90E-03

-0.287

-1.179

-0.173
0.251
6.656E-02
0.792
0.793

-0.501
0.520**
0.108

-1.346
4.915
0.964
19.341

1.188E-02
-5.11E-02
-7.92E-03
5.031E-02
0.813

0.141
-0.434**
-0.053

0.400
-4.318
-0.495
5.304

N = 58, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 [Model N6]
The model relies on estimates for the number of Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the years 1945-1957, when Department of Justice annual
reports do not publish the number. Assuming some modest growth
over time, the model sets the number at 500 for 1945-1950, and at 540
for 1951-1957. “Civil and criminal cases per AUSA” was calculated by
adding the number of criminal cases terminated to the number of
civil cases terminated in which the United States appeared as a party,
and dividing the total by the number of prosecutors for each year.
“Civil and criminal cases per judge” was calculated by adding the total
number of criminal cases and civil cases terminated each year, and dividing by the number of district court judges on the bench for that
year.

